Clemson University

TigerPrints
All Dissertations

Dissertations

5-2017

A Resilient Control Approach to Secure Cyber
Physical Systems (CPS) with an Application on
Connected Vehicles
Zoleikha Abdollahi Biron
Clemson University, zabdoll@g.clemson.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_dissertations
Recommended Citation
Abdollahi Biron, Zoleikha, "A Resilient Control Approach to Secure Cyber Physical Systems (CPS) with an Application on Connected
Vehicles" (2017). All Dissertations. 1869.
https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_dissertations/1869

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Dissertations at TigerPrints. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Dissertations by
an authorized administrator of TigerPrints. For more information, please contact kokeefe@clemson.edu.

A RESILIENT CONTROL APPROACH TO SECURE CYBER PHYSICAL
SYSTEMS (CPS) WITH AN APPLICATION ON CONNECTED VEHICLES
A Dissertation
Presented to
the Graduate School of
Clemson University

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy
Automotive Engineering

by
Zoleikha Abdollahi Biron
May 2017

Accepted by:
Dr. Pierluigi Pisu, Committee Chair
Dr. Richard Brooks, Co-chair
Dr. Beshah Ayalew
Dr. Yongqiang Wang

ABSTRACT

The objective of this dissertation is to develop a resilient control approach to secure
Cyber Physical Systems (CPS) against cyber-attacks, network failures and potential
physical faults. Despite being potentially beneficial in several aspects, the connectivity in
CPSs poses a set of specific challenges from safety and reliability standpoint. The first
challenge

arises

from

unreliable

communication

network

which

affects

the

control/management of overall system. Second, faulty sensors and actuators can degrade
the performance of CPS and send wrong information to the controller or other subsystems
of the CPS. Finally, CPSs are vulnerable to cyber-attacks which can potentially lead to
dangerous scenarios by affecting the information transmitted among various components of
CPSs. Hence, a resilient control approach is proposed to address these challenges. The
control approach consists of three main parts:(1) Physical fault diagnostics: This part makes
sure the CPS works normally while there is no cyber-attacks/ network failure in the
communication network; (2) Cyber-attack/failure resilient strategy: This part consists of a
resilient strategy for specific cyber-attacks to compensate for their malicious effects ; (3)
Decision making algorithm: The decision making block identifies the specific existing
cyber-attacks/ network failure in the system and deploys corresponding control strategy to
minimize the effect of abnormality in the system performance. In this dissertation, we
consider a platoon of connected vehicle system under Co-operative Adaptive Cruise Control
(CACC) strategy as a CPS and develop a resilient control approach to address the
aforementioned challenges.
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The first part of this dissertation investigates fault diagnostics of connected vehicles
assuming ideal communication network. Very few works address the real-time diagnostics
problem in connected vehicles. This study models the effect of different faults in sensors
and actuators, and also develops fault diagnosis scheme for detectable and identifiable
faults. The proposed diagnostics scheme is based on sliding model observers to detect,
isolate and estimate faults in the sensors and actuators. One of the main advantages of
sliding model approach lies in applicability to nonlinear systems. Therefore, the proposed
method can be extended for other nonlinear cyber physical systems as well.
The second part of the proposed research deals with developing strategies to
maintain performance of cyber-physical systems close to the normal, in the presence of
common cyber-attacks and network failures. Specifically, the behavior of Dedicated ShortRange Communication (DSRC) network is analyzed under cyber-attacks and failures
including packet dropping, Denial of Service (DOS) attack and false data injection attack.
To start with, packet dropping in network communication is modeled by Bernoulli random
variable. Then an observer based modifying algorithm is proposed to modify the existing
CACC strategy against the effect of packet dropping phenomena. In contrast to the existing
works on state estimation over imperfect communication network in CPS which mainly use
either holding previous received data or Kalman filter with intermittent observation, a
combination of these two approaches is used to construct the missing data over packet
dropping phenomena. Furthermore, an observer based fault diagnostics based on sliding
mode approach is proposed to detect, isolate and estimate sensor faults in connected vehicles
platoon.
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Next, Denial of Service (DoS) attack is considered on the communication network.
The effect of DoS attack is modeled as an unknown stochastic delay in data delivery in the
communication network. Then an observer based approach is proposed to estimate the real
data from the delayed measured data over the network. A novel approach based on LMI
theory is presented to design observer and estimate the states of the system via delayed
measurements. Next, we explore and alternative approach by modeling DoS with unknown
constant time delay and propose an adaptive observer to estimate the delay. Furthermore,
we study the effects of system uncertainties on the DoS algorithm. In the third algorithm,
we considered a general CPS with a saturated DoS attack modeled with constant unknown
delay. In this part, we modeled the DoS via a PDE and developed a PDE based observer to
estimate the delay as well as states of the system while the only available measurements are
delayed.
Furthermore, as the last cyber-attack of the second part of the dissertation, we
consider false data injection attack as the fake vehicle identity in the platoon of vehicles. In
this part, we develop a novel PDE-based modeling strategy for the platoon of vehicles
equipped with CACC. Moreover, we propose a PDE based observer to detect and isolate
the location of the false data injection attack injected into the platoon as fake identity.
Finally, the third part of the dissertation deals with the ongoing works on an
optimum decision making strategy formulated via Model Predictive Control (MPC). The
decision making block is developed to choose the optimum strategy among available
strategies designed in the second part of the dissertation.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1. Research Objectives
Cyber Physical Systems (CPS) represent a diverse class of systems with various
applications in critical industrial systems as well as infrastructures such as power grids [1],
water distribution systems [2]-[3], Intelligent Transportation System (ITS)[4]-[5], building
automation and many other systems vital for human well-being [5]. In general, CPS denoted
to a certain category of systems containing three main parts: (i) Physical plants, (ii)
Controller and (iii) Communication network (see Fig. 1). Connectivity among different
subsystems and the controller via communication network makes CPS faster, more efficient
and cost effective. Indeed, communication network eases data transfer process between
sensors to controller and controller to actuators. Furthermore, shared communication
network is less expensive comparing to wired network of private communication network
for each subsystem. However, due to the control center and multi-purpose communication
network, critical cyber physical systems are vulnerable to cyber-attacks and network failures
as well as physical faults [6].
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Figure 1: Cyber physical systems and schematic representation of it.
Cyber-attacks, network failures and physical faults (in the physical parts of the CPS)
are potential causes that degrade the performance of the cyber physical systems. Physical
fault diagnostics of CPS is possible by utilizing the following approaches: 1) model-based
approaches, 2) Signal processing based approaches, and 3) Knowledge-based approaches.
In contrast, from the system control perspective, security and resiliency of cyber physical
systems against cyber-attacks and network failures is more challenging due to the
unexpected inherent of cyber-attacks. Some of the common network failures and possible
cyber-attacks in CPS referring to the existing literatures are packet drop out [7]-[8], Denial
of Service (DoS) attack [9]-[10], replay attack [11] and false data injection [12].
Resiliency of cyber physical systems is indeed a 3S-oriented design, that is, stability,
security, and systematicness: Stability means the CPS can achieve a stable sensing-actuation
close-loop control even though the inputs (sensing data) have noise or attacks; Security
means that the system can overcome the cyber–physical interaction attacks; and
Systematicness means that the system has a seamless integration of sensors and actuators.
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There two main approaches to tackle the security problem of cyber physical systems: (i)
computer science methods (ii) Control oriented methods.
Some of the most common cyber-attacks modeled in CPS in control oriented frame
works are depicted in Fig. 3. In majority of the modeling approaches, the CPS is is
considered as a linear time invariant (LTI) system or descriptor system.

Figure 2: Potential cyber-attacks for a subsystem of CPS
Referring to the control oriented attack analysis in CPS, the false information can
include: an incorrect measurement, an incorrect time when the measurement was observed,
or an incorrect sender id. The adversary can launch these attacks by obtaining the secret key
or by compromising some sensors (A1) or controllers (A3). A2 and A4 represent denial of
service (DoS) attacks where the adversary prevents the controller from receiving sensor
measurements or sending an input update. To launch a DoS the adversary can jam the
communication channels, compromise devices and prevent them from sending data, attack
the routing protocols, etc. A5 represents a direct attack (false data injection) against the
actuators or an external physical attack on the plant. Along with cyber-attacks and network
failures (such as packet dropping), CPSs subject to physical failures and faults. To secure
cyber physical systems against cyber-attacks, we need to make sure that anomaly in CPS
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performance is not caused by physical faults of the system. Hence, as a pre-requisite for
securing the CPS, a fault diagnostics algorithm is designed to detect potential faults in the
system [9].
In light of the above discussion, the objective of this proposed research is to develop
a general approach that improves the performance of cyber physical systems making them
more resilient to cyber-attacks/ network failures as well as physical failures. Hence, for each
possible cyber-attacks/network failure, an algorithm to modify the controller of system and
maintain the performance of whole CPS close to normal is presented. Also, along with
modified controllers, a fault diagnosis scheme is presented to detect, isolate and estimate
physical faults in CPS. Furthermore, as the last part of thesis, we develop a decision making
strategy to switch among available control signals to choose the optimum control strategy
which guarantees the smoothness of the performance as well as safety. As a case study of
this approach, a platoon of connected vehicles communicating through Dedicated ShortRange Communication (DSRC) network is considered.
1.2. Research Motivation
In recent years, we have noticed a rise of smart vehicles with capabilities like
wireless communication, gateways and driving assistance systems. Such smart vehicular
advancements have led to several emerging vehicular technologies. One of such
technologies as a particular focus of this research is connected vehicles which is classified
as a distributed cyber physical system. Indeed the concept of the connectivity in vehicular
network can potentially results in improvements, e.g. minimizing the risk of accident and
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increasing traffic throughput. However, this connectivity also introduces new challenges
from security point of view.
In modern transportation systems, smart vehicles are not isolated mechanical
devices with merely mobility purposes anymore. Nowadays, smart vehicles are equipped
with wireless gateways, Bluetooth and Wi-Fi connection enabling them to connect and
communicate with external world [13]-[14]. Hence, by developing the communication
capabilities to peer to peer, vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I)
communication, the new promising technology as connected vehicles will emerge which,
essentially, can improve the safety, efficiency, and effectiveness of the overall
transportation system. However, similar to other CPSs, this technology suffers from several
challenges, mainly from safety and reliability point of view and is vulnerable to the
aforementioned cyber-attacks and network failures [15]-[16].
Hacking the smart vehicles is not an impossible mission and several existing
literature explore the vulnerabilities of the smart car regarding to cyber-attack and hacking
issues. In [13]-[14], and [17] vulnerabilities of car regarding to the Control Area Network
(CAN) bus are explored. Although for the aforementioned vulnerabilities having physical
access to the car and more specifically to the On-Board Diagnostics, attacker do not limit
themselves to having physical access to the car. Indeed, comprehensive studies in University
of California San Diego, University of Washingtonand University of South Carolina reveal
that, car hacking without physical access is possible [20]-[18]. In [20], authors present a
privacy and security evaluation of wireless Tire Pressure Monitoring Systems (TPMS) using
both laboratory experiments with isolated tire pressure sensor modules and experiments
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with a complete vehicle system. Fig. 3 shows existing vulnerabilities of a smart car to
potential cyber-attacks.
Since each individual smart car is already vulnerable to cyber-attacks, the threat is
more critical when a group of vehicles share their information through communication
network together as connected vehicles. Fig. 4 explains the potential threat through the
internet and telematics units to compromise data in connected vehicles. More specifically,
connected vehicular networks are vulnerable to packet dropping [21], communication
induced delay [22], scheduling issues and malicious cyber-attacks [23]. Hence, the vehicular
control systems must be capable of handling and surviving such adverse situations. The
outcome of these researches support importance of the treat of cyber-attacks in connected
vehicles that can be injected to the communication network via a hacked car or with a
malicious car generating fake identity. A crucial need for designing the in-vehicle
control/management systems that takes such issues into consideration and maintains the
safety and reliability of the overall system does exist in automotive industries.
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Figure 3: Vulnerabilities in a smart car

Figure 4: Flow of hacking a car via smart phone
1.3. Research Contributions
The main contribution is the development of control oriented algorithm to provide
resiliency in cyber physical systems toward physical faults, network failures and cyberattacks. This algorithm is an observer based methodology consisting different strategy for
different attack scenarios. The best strategy is selected via optimum decision making block
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to apply the best available control strategy to the system to maintain the performance under
failure or attack. To fulfill this objective, the following contributions are obtained:


The development of Ordinary Differential Equation (ODE) based and Partial
Differential Equation (PDE) based models of connected vehicles for behavior
analysis under various cyber-attacks and network failures.



The development of a fault diagnosis algorithm that detects, isolates and
estimates specific sensor faults (relative distance and velocity sensors) and
actuator failures (acceleration pedal) in connected vehicles.



The development of estimation algorithm that estimates the lost pack in the
packet dropping phenomena to provide the correct information to the controller.
So, the control action maintains resiliency against packet drop incident.



The development resilient algorithms against DoS attack in the communication
network. These algorithms consist of three methodologies for different modeling
of DoS attack.



The development of novel method to model false data injection attack in cyber
physical systems as fake node (ghost node).



The development of PDE based diagnostics algorithm to detect and isolate the
false injection attack into the system.



The development of optimum decision making methodology to select the best in

the fault/ cyber-attack occurrence in the system to maintain the performance of the
system close to the normal condition.
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1.4. Dissertation Organization
The rest of the proposal is organized as follows. Chapter2 includes a brief overview
of connected vehicles modeling and working principals. Chapter 3 discusses the security
problems in cyber physical systems along with state of the art literature review, gap analysis
and a brief review on fault diagnostics and observer design tools. In Chapter 4 provides the
proposed algorithm for physical fault diagnostics including faults detection, isolation and
estimation. Then, Chapter 5 discusses the proposed algorithm on packet dropping
phenomena as network failure. Chapter 5 includes three algorithms on DoS attack detection
and estimation along with resiliency to the attack. In Chapter 6, a PDE model of connected
vehicles along with novel approach for false data injection attack detection is provided.
Chapter 7 explain the decision making strategy for the aforementioned algorithms. Finally,
Chapter 9 concludes the dissertation along with the discussion of the future extensions.
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CHAPTER TWO
WORKING PRINCIPLE AND MODELING OF CONNECTED VEHICLES

2.1. Working Principle
Some principal simplifying assumptions which will hold for the duration of all our analysis
in this proposed research are as the following:
1- A single lane highway only is considered; multi-lane scenarios with lane changing
effects are not considered.
2- We assume that the characteristics of all vehicles and drivers are the same. This
assumption simplifies calculations but is probably not necessary for our analysis to
work.
3- DSRC communication network is a shared broadcasting network. Therefore, each
vehicle in the platoon is required to listen to the safety messages communicated in
the specific time slot dedicated to safety messages.

2.2. Modeling
The car-following methodology for the simulation and analysis of highway traffic
models vehicles as discrete entities moving in continuous space. Referring to the existing
works, two common car-following methodologies are Gipps’s model and Adaptive Cruise
Control (ACC). Gipp’s model contains a number of parameters which purport to model
different behavioral features of driver, and is thus rather more complicated than the
reductionist models which can be found in the mathematical literatures. However, Gipps’s
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model which is explained in detail in [24]-[25], still too mathematical for control purposes.
In contrast to Gipps’s model a simplified control oriented car-modeling used in several
existing literatures is ACC [26]-[28]. In the current existing Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC)
system, the range (i.e., relative distance) and range rate to the preceding vehicle are
measured with a radar or LIDAR sensor [26]. While, Cooperative Cruise Control (CCC)
[15]-[16] and Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC) [29]-[33][33]are essentially a
vehicle-following control methodology that automatically accelerates and decelerates so as
to keep a desired distance to the preceding vehicle. To do this, in addition to onboard sensors
like radars, vehicles should be equipped with wireless communication devices, such as
Dedicated Short-Range Communication (DSRC), to receive extra information of the
preceding vehicle(s).
The use of CACC control strategy, especially in heavy duty vehicles, can cause
lower traffic flow in roads. To achieve this task, onboard sensors such as radar are employed
that measures relative distance and velocity between vehicles. Further, additional
information of preceding vehicle(s), such as the desired acceleration is received through the
wireless communication network. In a cooperative setting, a vehicle should adjust its speed/
acceleration using the information from multiple vehicles ahead and behind. To address this
objective several control strategies are considered to be implemented in the vehicle to use
the receiving information for vehicle in front and behind, combine them with current states
of the car and generate corresponding control input for vehicle. Some of the most important
control approaches in cooperative adaptive cruise control are model predictive [33], and
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PID [30]-[31] controller. Among these controller, the PID is the most common and more
effective and less computationally burden.
Following similar notation of [30], a homogenous platoon of 𝑚 vehicle equipped
with CACC strategy is considered as the case study of this proposed research (see Fig. 5).

Figure 5: Platoon of vehicles equipped with CACC.
Each vehicle in the platoon can be modeled as a linear system with (1).


 di   vi 1  vi 

  
ai

 vi   

 ai   1
1
    ai  ui 
 
 

, i  Sm \{1}

(1)

where S m stands for set of all vehicles in the platoon of length of m. di  qi 1  qi  Li is the
distance between vehicle i and i  1 , where qi and qi 1 are the rear bumper position of
vehicle i and

i 1 ,

respectively, and Li is the length of vehicle i ; vi is the velocity and ai

is the acceleration of vehicle i . Moreover, ui is the vehicle input, to be interpreted as
desired acceleration, and  is the time constant representing the driveline dynamics. Also,
the following control policy for the inter-vehicle spacing is adopted:
d r ,i (t )  hvi (t ),

i  Sm \ {1}

(2)
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where d r ,i is the desired distance between vehicle i and i  1 , h is the time headway. The
main objective is to regulate the di to d r ,i ( t ) , i.e.,
ei (t )  di (t )  d r ,i (t )  0 as t  

(3)

without losing the generality, we consider Li  0 for simplicity. Substituting the equation
d i  qi 1  qi  Li in (3), the regulating error can be re-written as:
ei (t )  qi 1 (t )  qi (t )  hvi (t )

(4)

The following dynamic controller is considered to achieve the zero regulation error:
1
1
1
ui   ui  (k p ei  kd ei )  ui 1
h
h
h

(5)

where ui 1 is the desired acceleration for the preceding vehicle. This information is
communicated through the DSRC network, hence, it is subject to packet drop failure in the
network. k p and kd are the controller coefficients. Furthermore, it is shown that for a
bounded ui 1 and subject to following constraints on the controller gains: k p , k p  0 , the
inter-vehicle distance di is regulated to di ,r as defined by spacing policy (2)[31].
The block diagram of the closed- loop system for vehicle i, subject to the controller is
shown in Fig.6
with
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Figure 6: Block scheme of the CACC system
TABLE I: Vehicle platooning model nomenclature
Symbol

Definition and Unit

Symbol

Definition and Unit

𝑑𝑟,𝑖

reference relative distance

𝑇𝑠

ℎ
𝑒𝑖 (𝑡)

time headway.

𝜒(𝑘)

error
the desired acceleration for the preceding
vehicle (vehicle 𝑖 − 1)
controller coefficients

𝑢𝑖
𝜏

network sampling time
a variable that represents the packet drop out
phenomenon at time instant 𝑘
control input of vehicle 𝑖

𝑢𝑖−1
𝑘𝑝
𝑘𝑑
𝑑𝑖

𝜃𝑑
𝜃𝑣

controller coefficients
inter-vehicle distance

Superscript

±

positive/negative electrode
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time constant
equivalent output error injection
equivalent output error injection

CHAPTER THREE
SECURITY PROBLEMS IN CYBER PHYSICAL SYSTEMS
As it mentioned in the introduction section, cyber physical systems are subject to
physical faults, network failures and cyber-attack. To secure a CPS against these potential
sources of performance degradation, a control oriented algorithm is proposed. The
algorithm contains three main parts: (1) Physical fault diagnostics; (2) Cyber-attacks/failure
resilient strategies; (3) Decision making.
1) Physical Faults Diagnostics: This part includes an observer based fault diagnostics
scheme to address issues regarding to the potential physical faults and failures in
hardware components in the CPS.
2) Cyber-attacks/network failure resilient strategies: This component acts as a state
machine system with several strategies designed for specific cyber-attacks or
network failure. Each strategy is designed by utilizing different control theory tools
e.g. observer design, adaptive control, and sliding mode theory.

These

methodologies are used to design resilient strategies for CPS to maintain the
functionality of CPS and keep its performance close to the normal when cyberattacks occur. Hence, by applying corresponding strategy, the CPS will be resilient
to that specific attack or network failure.
3) Decision maker: Since all strategies in the Cyber resilient component are
independent from each other, to apply the best strategy for the existing cyber-attack
or network failure, a decision needs to be made. To obtain this objective a decision
making block based on Model Predictive Control (MPC) is designed. At each

sample time, the decision maker block chooses best available control action
designed in the previous part while guaranteeing smooth behavior of CPS.
The overview of this research is depicted in Fig.7. In the following each of this
component with their design approach will be discussed in details.

Figure 7: Overview of proposed scheme to secure a CPS
Next, we have a literature review for each component in more detail to provide the existing
research gaps.
3.1. Physical Fault Diagnostics Problem
3.1.1. Problem Formulation and Challenges
Similar to any physical systems, cyber physical systems are subjected to physical
faults in their components including sensors and actuators and hardware. To secure the CPS
against cyber-attacks, normal operation of CPS in no cyber-attacks condition should be
guaranteed. This is important due to the connectivity of different parts of a CPS which can
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causes to propagate the error of one part to other components of CPS. In more detailed
explanation, small error in a sensor readings which is transmitted and propagated to several
controller of supplants of a CPS can compromise performance of those sub-plants and
interpreted as cyber-attacks while in reality there is no cyber-threat in the system. Similarly,
in our case study of connected vehicles, wrong velocity sensor or acceleration information
can be transmitted to follower vehicles and degrade their control strategy and provide an
error in regulating the desire distance. Consequently, the error propagation inside the string
of the platoon can treat the stability of sting by either breaking the platoon or causing
accident in the platoon. Hence, reliability of CPS is a critical issue that need to be addressed.
Different failure mechanisms can occur in a CPS during operation, but, the most important
and significant ones relate to sensor and actuator faults. Some of these faults, if not detected
or isolated, may lead to catastrophic failures. At a higher level, diagnostic problem in a CPS
can be classified into three types based on the component where the failure occurs: sensor
fault, process/system fault, actuation fault.
In a broad classification, existing approaches can be divided into three groups: 1)
Model-based approaches, 2) Signal processing based approaches, and 3) Knowledge-based
approaches. Model-based approaches utilize a dynamic model of the system in their
diagnostic algorithm. Signal processing based approaches use different kinds of spectral
analysis, time series analysis and statistical methods such as pattern recognition, feature
extraction etc. In knowledge based approaches, a priori knowledge of the system is used
along with some reasoning algorithms. In this discussion, we will concentrate on model-
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based diagnostic approaches due to the availability of the dynamic model of most of the
CPSs.
3.1.2. Literature Review
In this research, we focus on model-based fault diagnostics approach to detect,
isolate faults and failures in CPS. In the model-based diagnostics a dynamic model of the
system is used to predict the output which is compared to the measured signals from the
physical system. The difference between the measured data and predicted data is used to
generate a residual signal which has the idealized property of being zero in case of no faults
and nonzero in presence of faults. This residual signal is then processed further to achieve
isolation of the detected faults. Model-based designs of fault diagnosis scheme follow the
sequential steps: system and fault modeling, fault detectability analysis, residual generation,
fault isolation and decision making. Surveys of different model-based schemes can be found
in [34]-[35]. Faults generally occur in sensors, actuators or in the process. Actuator and
sensor faults are generally modeled as additive deviations from the nominal model whereas
process faults are generally modeled as multiplicative faults which reflect as changes in
parameters. In our case study as CPS, the potential faults and failures can occur in vehicles
actuators and sensor measurements which are transmitted to other vehicles in the platooning
network via DSRC.
Vehicle diagnostics are widely explored and is one of the utmost interest for
automotive industries and OEMS. Hence, several researches for improving the functionality
of On-Board Diagnostics (OBD_II) are going on. However, unlike fault diagnostics on
engine operation which is explored widely, kinematic characteristics of the vehicle such
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velocity sensor, radar sensor faults as well as acceleration pedal failure are not considered
in the on-board diagnostics [36]-[37].In the intelligent transportation where a vehicle shares
its information among other vehicles in the vehicular network, wrong information not only
treat the safety of individual car, but also, it can threaten other vehicles performance. Faulty
sensors can affect the individual vehicle’s safe operation and in turn will create a potentially
unsafe node in the vehicular network. Nevertheless, there are very few literatures address
this issue of connected vehicles. [38], presents an approach to address some of the
challenges in connected vehicle system fault diagnostics, such as the diagnostics of
unexpected faults, and infrequent or intermittent faults. However, the existing literatures
do not consider potential faults in the sensor measurements which can be transmitted
through the DSRC communication network to other vehicles in the vehicular network. In
this research, we address the sensor and actuator fault detection and analyze the
identifiability of these faults and failures in connected vehicles.
3.1.2. Gaps in Existing Literature


There is no complete research on connected vehicles fault diagnostics with specific
focus on sensor and actuator fault detection which their data is transmitted through
communication network.



No fault estimation approach to compensate the effect of existing faults in the
system and design fault tolerant control.



Most of the existing model-based fault detection approaches have one or more of
the following issues: 1) utilize a linearized model, 2) are computationally
expensive, and 3) lack theoretical guarantees of the convergence of the estimator.
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3.2. Cyber Attacks/Network Failures Problem
3.2.1. Problem Formulation and Challenges
The performance of CPS highly relies on the reliability of its communication
network specifically if there is no physical malfunctioning in the system. Hence, providing
good maintenance on the hardware of the CPS and health monitoring via fault diagnostics
approaches, guarantees the physical performance of a CPS. However, cyber-attacks,
malicious adversaries and network failure are still some of the crucial sources of
performance degradation in cyber physical systems which are not possible to detect via
physical fault diagnostics methods.
One of the most common failure in the communication network is packet dropping
phenomena. Wireless links are known to be prone to errors and failures. Packet dropping
occurs due to a number of factors including occasional hardware failures, degradation in
link quality, and channel congestion etc. Although many network protocols have retransmission mechanisms embedded, for real-time feedback control data, it may be
advantageous to discard the failed packets on their first transmission because re-transmitted
packets may have too large latency to be useful [39]. Re-transmission may also delay the
transmission of new packets. In a typical CPS, due to limited computing power of the
communication modules, error correction techniques are not common on the lower network
levels. However, cyber-attacks are not considered as network failures and in fact they have
designed smartly by attacker. Hence, modeling the cyber-attacks from control perspective
is more challenging than network failures and requires detailed analyses over network and
attacker capabilities. The most common cyber-attacks on CPS referring to the existing
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literature consists of Denial of Service (DoS) attack, False Data Injection attack (or
deception attack), Replay attack and Stealthy attack.
Denial of service (DoS) attacks are perhaps the most detrimental attack to CPSs that
affects the packet delivery because they have been proven capable of shutting an
organization off from the Internet or dramatically slowing down network links [40].
Definition of DoS attack may vary in different studies on DoS attack, however, all these
studies describe the effect of DoS attack as the same. The violation of availability of sensor
and control data is known as denial-of-service (DoS). DoS attacks can be classified into
several different types, in which the packet flooding attack and data jamming or
compromising by a malicious adversary are prevalent [41]-[42]. Attackers may flood a
network with a large volume of data to deliberately consume the limited resources, such as
CPU cycles, memory, network bandwidth, and packet buffers. Consequently, time delay
and packet loss of transmitted information in CPS become worse under such attacks, which
in turn may significantly impair the system performance. False data injection attack is a
well-studied attack in cyber physical systems particularly in recent years. In false data
injection attack scenario, the attacker has the capability to corrupt the original message
by injecting additional false data into the actual value. The message either is transmitted
form sensors to the controller or from the controller to actuators [43]. The attacker in the
replay attack intercepts data of the system and re-transmits it while corrupting the
performance of the system [44] . Another cyber-attack studied in the cyber physical systems
is stealthy attack. In the stealthy attack, the attacker wishes to induce perturbation in the
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control loop by compromising a subset of the sensors and injecting an exogenous control
input, without incurring detection from an anomaly detector [45].
With every day new emerging technologies, new cyber-attacks are developed and it
is not possible to keep track of all existing cyber-attacks in one research. However, the effect
of the majority of these attacks can be modeled with one or several of these existing
dominant attacks.
3.2.2. Literature Review
The main challenges regarding to securing a CPS toward cyber-attacks contains of
modeling the cyber-attacks, detecting and developing resilient strategy to maintain the
functionality of the CPS in the presence of cyber-attacks. In this section, we provide
literature review over all these three challenges on cyber-attacks in cyber physical systems.
Modeling cyber-attacks is essential for understanding and analyzing their impacts
on Cyber-physical Systems (CPSs). There are two main methods for modeling cyberattacks: graph-based approaches, and mathematical (Control-oriented) modeling
approaches.
Both static and dynamic graph-based techniques such as attack trees and Bayesian
networks are well-known for attack modeling as they have the advantage of combining user
friendly, visual features with algorithms that allow analysis of the behavior of the attack in
the network [46]-[49]. For example, Petri net modeling approaches [49] have been used as
a more flexible method for modeling the cyber-attacks in large cyber physical
infrastructures such as smart grids. For such a complex CPS, hierarchical methods for
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constructing large petri nets from smaller size petri nets have also been proposed [49].
Although graph-based approaches have their advantages for engineering applications that
involve the design of attack detection methods, security analysis and security design in large
scale CPSs, in industrial applications these models are too complex to be used. Instead of
graph-based models, mathematical approaches for modeling the attack in SCADA
(Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) have been used for CPSs such as power
networks and smart grids. In [50] In mathematical approaches, cyber-physical systems are
typically modeled as time-varying or, the authors considered the large scale CPS as linear
discrete-time decentralized system, which can be modeled by state space equations and the
cyber-attacks are modeled as additional exogenous inputs that comprise behavior of
system’s components [51]-[53]. However, it is not possible to model all cyber-attacks and
network failures just as an exogenous inputs in the system as they affect the whole CPS
dynamics in different manners. Several investigation are done on modeling the cyberattacks in control frameworks with particular focus on specific attack.
A wide range of works exists on that explored the data loss problem and physical
fault diagnosis problem in general networked control systems. Packet dropping phenomena
provides unreliability and uncertainty into the communication which makes the modeling
of the network and analysis of data more challenging task [27]-[28], [37]. In general, there
are two methods to model the packet drop out phenomenon in communication networks:
(1) Bernoulli model [54],[15] [58]- [64]and (2) Markov Model [7]-[8], [55]-[56]. Bernoulli
random variable is a simple memory less random variable while, modeling the packet

26

dropping with Markov Model is a more complex and sophisticated methodology which
captures most of the characteristics of the packet dropping phenomena.
Cyber-attacks are explored and modeled in various cyber physical systems. DoS
attack is explore in power system [66] [68], smart grids [69], SCADA [70], and networked
control systems [66]-[67]. [69] discusses Malicious attacks targeting availability of gird
network as denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, which attempt to delay, block or even corrupt
information transmission in order to make network resources unavailable to communicating
nodes that need information exchange in the smart grid. In the existing literature on DoS
modeling, there are two main methodologies to model Denial of Service attack in a CPS
with control frame work; 1) time delay 2) packet loss [40]-[41]. Indeed, based on the
network communication protocol and attacker capabilities, DoS attacker can flood too much
data on the network to make packet congestion on the network and consequently packet will
loss. However, if the attacker does not make the attack too obvious on the network, it may
flood the packets randomly on the network and try to increase the service time on the
communication network [42].
False Data Injection attack is widely explored in cyber physical systems e.g.
power grid [75]-[76] electricity marker [71], water distribution and control systems [72][73]. The false data injection attack in CPS refers to a class of cyber-attacks in which
the attacker wishes to alter the integrity of system by compromising a subset of sensors
and sending inaccurate readings to controller or actuators data from controller. To operate
the attack, the attacker needs to carefully design his input to fool the controller since
abnormal sensor measurements will generally trigger an alarm [72]. In the majority of
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existing literature on modeling false data injection attack in control oriented framework, the
attack is modeled as an additive sensor/actuator fault on the original data. Hence, existing
fault detection algorithms, including Kalman filter [71]-[72] observer design [75], are
capable of detecting the false data injection attack in the system. However, developing
new skills to inject the cyber-attacks in the cyber physical system, attackers can
induce

more

intelligent

attacks

which are not diagnosable with fault detection

methodologies.
The second challenge in securing the CPS toward cyber-attacks is to provide the
CPS with an attack detection algorithm. There exist several investigations on modeling and
detection of cyber-attacks from computer science perspective. The current state of the art
methods used for cyber-attack detections are utilization of Intrusion Detection Systems
(IDS) and Honeypots. Intrusion detection systems continuously monitor the computer
system or network and generate alarms to inform the system administrator of suspicious
events. IDSs are now considered a necessary addition to the security infrastructure of an
organization [77]-[78]. The objective of intrusion detection is to detect malicious activities,
and accurately differentiate them from benign activities. Honeypots are needed to
supplement IDSs in the proposed security scheme because they complement most other
security technologies by taking a proactive stance. A honeypot is a closely monitored
computing resource used as a trap to ensnare attackers. As defined by Spitzner, “A honeypot
is a security resource whose value lies in being probed, attacked, or compromised [79].”
The principal objectives of honeypots are to divert attackers away from the critical resources
and study attacker exploits to create signatures for intrusion detection. The attraction of
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attackers to honeypots mitigates the threat of malicious attacks and thus helps secure
valuable information and important services located on the real targets.
As the last but very crucial challenge of cyber security in CPS, attack resiliency is
utmost importance to maintain the functional of the CPS in the presence of cyber-attacks.
However, very few works explore resiliency of systems under attacks and network failures.
Several groups have looked at control systems with packet loss in their communication
network, an area that has been recently surveyed in the context of packet-switched networks
by Hespanha [57]. In particular, there has been considerable effort in analyzing the effect
of packet loss [58]-[60]. Also, several approaches have been used to compensate the impact
of packet drop out in networked control systems. For instance [61], uses a predictor to
modify the controller in the presence of packet drop out. Generally speaking referring to the
existing literature, to modify the controller in most of the networked control systems and
cyber physical systems, a good state estimation is required. State estimation over packet
dropping networks is explored in the existing literature with different methodologies such
as discrete Kalman filter with intermittent observation [54], [64], optimal estimation
[59],[61], and using multiple description coding [62]. Although these general results exist
for networked control systems, very few attempts have been made towards the similar issues
in connected vehicle applications [64]. In [10],[113] DoS is considered as a class of attack
strategies primarily intended to affect the timeliness of information exchange. The
fundamental challenge in DoS attack compensation is to develop a resilient controller to
keep the performance of the CPS close to the normal while measured sensor information
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are corrupted by attacker. In [5],[113][112], authors comprehensively survey the concept
and strategies for building a resilient and integrated cyber–physical system (CPS).
Furthermore, the DoS attack in the DSRC network degrades the quality of packet
transmission and induce delay in network service time and consequently in transmission.
Therefore, to develop a countermeasure on DoS attack in the connected vehicles system, an
estimation of states over delay induced by the attack on communication network is required.
The state estimation and fault detection problems over random measurement delays are
studied for cyber physical systems and the networked control systems in several existing
literatures [114]-[118]. Different approaches including sliding mode observer design [118],
robust estimation [119], Continuous Time Hidden Markov Model (CTHMM) [120] and
discrete time approaches based on state feedback theory and Kalman filter observer design
[115] are developed and proposed in literatures to estimate the states of the CPS under
delayed measurements. However, in majority of the existing literatures, the delay induced
in the measurements due to the communication network is considered to be known. While,
under the DoS attack this assumption no longer is valid. Consequently, a new approach to
estimate the state of the CPS under DoS attach which degrade the service time of the
communication network is required.
3.2.3. Gaps in Existing Literature


Majority of existing literature address the effect of packet dropping in CPS system
by holding the previous value of lost data which is not necessarily applicable for
connected vehicles system with changing driving profile.
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Several studies try to estimate the lost information using Kalman filter with
intermittent observation, while this approach is limited for discrete time systems.



Very few study on fault estimation over imperfect communication network and in
all these works the dynamics of fault are known and it changes very slow which is
a big assumption.



Real time fault diagnostics under communication failure was not explored for
connected vehicles




Very few literature exists on actuator fault detection in connected vehicles
State estimation under unknown delay are not explored for CPS and connected
vehicles.



Very few researches on probabilistic delay with known distribution, however, there
is no estimation on delay in observer.



Lack of theoretical proof of estimation error convergence



In the majority of existing literature, the false data injection attack is modeled
very similar to additive fault/failure in the control oriented frameworks
Considering general topology (configuration) for cyber physical systems, it is
very likely to detect the injected attack using different methodologies available
for model-based diagnosis e.g. Kalman filter [28]. However, with all technology
enhancements, cyber-attacks are become smarter and smarter which make them
impossible to be detected via traditional fault diagnosis methods.



The effects of fake identity (fake node) in cyber physical systems is explored very
rarely.
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There is no work on detection and isolating the fake identity in cyber physical
system as well as connected vehicles.

3.3. Brief Review of Existing Fault Diagnosis and Observer Design
Approaches
In this section, a brief review of the existing fault diagnosis approaches for general
systems has been provided. In a broad classification, existing approaches can be divided
into three groups: 1) Model-based approaches, 2) Signal processing based approaches, and
3) Knowledge-based approaches [34]. Model-based approaches utilize a dynamic model of
the system in their diagnostic algorithm. Signal processing based approaches use different
kinds of spectral analysis, time series analysis and statistical methods such as pattern
recognition, feature extraction etc. In knowledge based approaches, a priori knowledge of
the system is used along with some reasoning algorithms. In model-based approaches,
dynamic system model is used to predict the output which is compared to the measured
signals from the physical system. The difference between the measured data and predicted
data is used to generate a residual signal which has the idealized property of being zero in
case of no faults and nonzero in presence of faults. This residual signal is then processed
further to achieve isolation of the detected faults.
Model-based designs of fault diagnosis scheme follow the sequential steps: system and fault
modeling, fault detectability analysis, residual generation, fault isolation and decision
making. Surveys of different model-based schemes can be found in [35], [83]. Faults
generally occur in sensors, actuators or in the process. Actuator and sensor faults are
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generally modeled as additive deviations from the nominal model whereas process faults
are generally modeled as multiplicative faults which reflect as changes in parameters.
Coming to the residual generation, there are various existing approaches some of which are
given below:
Parity relation approach: In parity space approach [86], the fundamental idea of
diagnosing a fault is by checking consistency of the mathematical relationships of the
system using available measurements [35].
Observer based method: In this method, an observer is used to estimate the states of the
system using available measurements. Then the estimated states along with the
measurements are used to generate the residual signals. There are several variations of the
observer based methods. For example, in unknown input observers [84], the state estimation
error is decoupled from the unknown input disturbance and noise. In Kalman filter based
method [85], the innovation sequence is used as residual signals.

Parameter estimation approach: This approach is based on the hypothesis that faults in
the system change the system parameters Error! Reference source not found.. Therefore,
ny deviation from the nominal parameter value will be an indication of fault.
Decision making is another important aspect of the fault diagnosis scheme. After the
residual is generated, it needs to be evaluated. This is critical because in general the residuals
do not have the ideal property of being zero in non-faulty condition due to model
uncertainties, disturbances, noise etc.
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CHAPTER FOUR
PHYSICAL FAULT DIAGNOSTICS ALGORITHM
Fault detection, isolation and estimation play important roles in assuring normal
performance of the CPS. Health monitoring of the CPS including the fault diagnostics
improves the reliability of the system and prohibits physical malfunctions to degrade the
whole functionality of the CPS. Indeed, fault detection and estimation provide necessary
information for the system to make the controller fault tolerant. In this chapter, a model
based diagnostics scheme based on sliding mode approach is proposed to detect and isolate
sensors faults and actuator failures in the platoon of vehicles as an example of CPSs.
In this part, we consider a platoon of connected vehicles equipped with CACC as
our case study. Furthermore, two nonlinear observer designs have been presented based-on
a linear model of each vehicle in the platoon. Both observers are based on sliding mode
approach based on the measurement on relative distance and velocity of each vehicle. Using
this algorithm, apart from detecting and isolating faults in relative distance and velocity and
failure in actuator, it is possible to estimate the fault in both sensors. The convergence of
error dynamics is proved using Lyapunov theorem. The developed scheme is a new
contribution to connected vehicles diagnostics research area with the following
characteristics: 1) Considers essential faults and failures in the system, 2) Theoretical
verification of the convergence of the state estimation error, 3) Theoretical verification of
fault estimation, and 4) Simple design and computationally efficient.
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4.1. State Space Modeling
Each vehicle in the platooning can be modeled as a linear time invariant system as
it is discussed in Chapter 2. This linear model is written in the form of state space
representation as following
𝑣𝑖−1 − 𝑣𝑖
𝑑̇𝑖
[𝑣̇ 𝑖 ] = [ 1 𝑎𝑖 1 ] ,
𝑖 = 𝑆𝑚 \{ 1}
(7)
−
𝑎
+
𝑢
𝑎̇ 𝑖
𝜏 𝑖
𝜏 𝑖
where the control input dynamics changes with state feedback and external inputs coming
from the vehicle in front through the DSRC network.
1

1

1

𝑢̇ 𝑖 = − ℎ 𝑢𝑖 + ℎ (𝑘𝑝 𝑒𝑖 + 𝑘𝑑 𝑒̇𝑖 ) + ℎ 𝑢𝑖−1

(8)

and
𝑒𝑖 (𝑡) = 𝑑𝑖 (𝑡) − ℎ𝑣𝑖 (𝑡)

(9)

Remark 1: We consider a homogenous platoon of vehicles. Therefore, all vehicles
in the platoon the same parameters. Also, each vehicle in the platoon, measures relative
distance with respect to preceding vehicle 𝑑𝑖 and its velocity.
Remark 2: The estimates of the sensor faults are fed back to the control policy to
compensate for the effect of these faults. Therefore, the control policy is extended
to be reconfigurable under such sensor faults.
Remark 3: Considering measurement on actuator signal of the vehicle, similar
approach can be applied for actuator fault to detect and estimate the failure in acceleration
pedal position. To avoid redundancy for now we focus on sensor faults.
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4.2. Diagnostics Scheme
The objective of the Sensor Fault Observers is to detect, isolate and estimate faults
in the on-board sensors, namely the range sensor (which measures 𝑑𝑖 ) and velocity sensor
(which measures 𝑣𝑖 ). It consists of two observers designed based on sliding mode
methodology which will be discussed shortly.
In presence of the faults, the measurements from the sensors can be written as:
𝑑𝑖𝑚 = 𝑑𝑖 + 𝛥𝑑𝑖

(10)

𝑣𝑖𝑚 = 𝑣𝑖 + 𝛥𝑣𝑖

(11)

where 𝑑𝑖𝑚 and 𝑣𝑖𝑚 are the measured variables and, 𝛥𝑑𝑖 and 𝛥𝑣𝑖 represent the sensor faults.
Remark 4: Note that, we have modelled the sensor faults as additive variables. These
additive variables represent: 1) bias type of faults which could be constant or time-varying,
or, 2) sensor gain faults where 𝑑𝑖𝑚 = 𝐾𝑑𝑖 = 𝑑𝑖 + 𝛥𝑑𝑖 with 𝛥𝑑𝑖 = (𝐾 − 1)𝑑𝑖 where 𝐾
represents the gain fault.
The observer structure is depicted in Fig. 8 and mathematically expressed as
0 −1 0
0
𝑑̂̇𝑖
𝑑̂𝑖
𝐿12
1
0 0
1
0
̇
[𝑣̂𝑖 ] = [
1] [𝑣̂𝑖 ] + [0] 𝑣𝑖−1 + [1] 𝑢𝑖 + [ 0 ] (𝑣𝑖𝑚 − 𝑣̂𝑖 )
0
0
−
0
0
𝑎̂𝑖
𝑎̂̇𝑖
𝜏
𝜏
𝜂11
+[ 0
0

0
sgn(𝑑𝑖𝑚 − 𝑑̂𝑖 )
]
𝜂22 ] [
sgn(𝑣𝑖𝑚 − 𝑣̂𝑖 )
0

𝑖 = 𝑆𝑚 \{ 1 , 2}

(12)

Furthermore, we define
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𝑑̃𝑖 = 𝑑𝑖 − 𝑑̂𝑖 , 𝑣̃𝑖 = 𝑣𝑖 − 𝑣̂𝑖 , 𝑎̃𝑖 = 𝑎𝑖 − 𝑎̂𝑖

(13)

Figure 8: Fault diagnostics scheme for connected vehicles
Remark 5: Note that, 𝑢𝑖 is control input of vehicle 𝑖 which derived by the following
dynamics:
1

1

1

𝑢̇ 𝑖 = − ℎ 𝑢𝑖 + ℎ (𝑘𝑝 𝑒𝑖 + 𝑘𝑑 𝑒̇𝑖 ) + ℎ 𝑢𝑖−1
Next, choosing L12  1 , the error dynamics under faults can be written as:
𝛥𝑣𝑖 − 𝜂11 sgn(𝑑̃𝑖 + 𝛥𝑑𝑖 )
𝑑̃̇𝑖
[𝑣̃̇𝑖 ] = [ 𝑎̃𝑖 − 𝜂22 sgn(𝑣̃𝑖 + 𝛥𝑣𝑖 ) ]
1
− 𝜏 𝑎̃𝑖
𝑎̃̇𝑖

(14)

Note that, under asymptotic condition, 𝑎̃𝑖 → 0 as 𝑡 → ∞ due to its first order stable
dynamics represented by the time constant 𝜏. Under the condition 𝑎̃𝑖 → 0, we analyze the
observer error under two different fault cases.
The sliding surfaces (which are defined by the terms inside ‘sign’) are 𝑆𝑑 = 𝑑̃𝑖 +
𝛥𝑑𝑖 and 𝑆𝑣 = 𝑣̃𝑖 + 𝛥𝑣𝑖 . The convergence to the first sliding surface can be analyzed using
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the Lyapunov function candidate 𝑉𝑑 = 0.5𝑆𝑑2 . The derivative of the Lyapunov function
candidate can be written as:
𝑉̇𝑑 = 𝑆𝑑 𝑆𝑑̇ = 𝑆𝑑 (𝑑̃̇𝑖 + 𝛥𝑑̇𝑖 )
𝑉̇𝑑 = 𝑆𝑑 (𝛥𝑣𝑖 − 𝜂11 sgn(𝑆𝑑 ) + 𝛥𝑑̇𝑖 )
⇒ 𝑉̇𝑑 ≤ |𝑆𝑑 |(|𝛥𝑣𝑖 + 𝛥𝑑̇𝑖 | − 𝜂11 )

(15)

Therefore, under the assumption of bounded 𝛥𝑣𝑖 and 𝛥𝑑̇𝑖 , and a choice of
sufficiently high positive gain 𝜂11 , we have 𝑉̇𝑑 < 0 and, hence the sliding surface 𝑆𝑑 = 0
can be reached. Now, on the sliding surface, we have 𝑆𝑑 = 𝑆𝑑̇ = 0 [88]. Therefore, based
on the error dynamics equation (14) and the aforementioned conditions 𝑆𝑑 = 𝑆𝑑̇ = 0, we
can write that:
−𝛥𝑑̇𝑖 = 𝛥𝑣𝑖 − 𝜃𝑑
⇒ 𝛥𝑑̇𝑖 + 𝛥𝑣𝑖 = 𝜃𝑑

(16)

where 𝜃𝑑 is the equivalent output error injection which is the filtered version of the
switching term 𝜂11 sgn(𝑆𝑑 ). For implementation, we can extract 𝜃𝑑 by passing 𝜂11 sgn(𝑆𝑑 )
through a low-pass filter of unity gain [88].
Similarly, the convergence to the second sliding surface can be analyzed using 𝑉𝑣 =
0.5𝑆𝑣2 . The derivative can be written as:
𝑉𝑣̇ = 𝑆𝑣 𝑆𝑣̇ = 𝑆𝑣 (𝑣̃̇𝑖 + 𝛥𝑣̇ 𝑖 )
⇒ 𝑉𝑣̇ = 𝑆𝑣 (−𝜂22 sgn(𝑆𝑣 ) + 𝛥𝑣̇ 𝑖 )
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⇒ 𝑉𝑣̇ ≤ |𝑆𝑣 |(|𝛥𝑣̇ 𝑖 | − 𝜂22 )

(17)

Therefore, under the assumption of bounded 𝛥𝑣̇ 𝑖 and a choice of sufficiently high
positive gain 𝜂22 , we have 𝑉𝑣̇ < 0 and, hence the sliding surface 𝑆𝑣 = 0 can be reached.
Now, on the sliding surface, we have 𝑆𝑣 = 𝑆𝑣̇ = 0 [88]. Therefore, based on the error
dynamics equation (14) and the aforementioned conditions, we can write that:
𝛥𝑣̇ 𝑖 = 𝜃𝑣

(18)

where 𝜃𝑣 is the equivalent output error injection which is the filtered version of the
switching term 𝜂22 sgn(𝑆𝑣 )[74]. For implementation, we can extract 𝜃𝑣 by passing
𝜂22 sgn(𝑆𝑣 ) through a low-pass filter of unity gain [88].
Assumption 1: we consider only one fault can occur at the same time (either 𝛥𝑣𝑖 or
𝛥𝑑𝑖 ) as single fault scenario.
Next, we analyze these two fault cases separately:
Case 1 (𝛥𝑣𝑖 = 0, 𝛥𝑑𝑖 ≠ 0): We have 𝛥𝑑̇𝑖 = 𝜃𝑑 , 𝜃𝑣 = 0. Therefore, we can
construct the following filter to estimate the fault:
𝑅̇1𝑖 = 𝜃𝑑

(19)

where 𝑅1𝑖 is the residual signal (output of the filter (30)) which serves as an estimate
of the fault 𝛥𝑑𝑖 ; and the input signal 𝜃𝑑 to the filter (19) is extracted from the switching
term 𝜂11 sgn(𝑆𝑑 ) as mentioned before.
Case 2 (𝛥𝑣𝑖 ≠ 0, 𝛥𝑑𝑖 = 0): We have 𝛥𝑣𝑖 = 𝜃𝑑 , 𝛥𝑣̇ 𝑖 = 𝜃𝑣 . Therefore, we can
construct the following filter to estimate the fault:
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𝑅̇2𝑖 = 𝜃𝑣

(20)

where 𝑅1𝑖 is the residual signal (output of the filter (20)) which serves as an estimate
of the fault vi ; and the input signal 𝜃𝑣 to the filter (20) is extracted from the switching term
𝜂22 sgn(𝑆𝑣 ) as mentioned before.
Based on the above analysis, the following fault signature table (Table 3) can be
constructed. Note that, in case of di fault, we have 𝜃𝑑 ≠ 0, 𝜃𝑣 = 0 and hence 𝑅1𝑖 ≠
0, 𝑅2𝑖 = 0. In case of 𝛥𝑣𝑖 fault, we have 𝜃𝑑 ≠ 0, 𝜃𝑣 ≠ 0 and hence 𝑅1𝑖 ≠ 0, 𝑅2𝑖 ≠ 0. This
signature can be used to detect and isolate the faults. Further, the estimates of the faults di
and 𝛥𝑣𝑖 will be 𝑅1𝑖 and 𝑅2𝑖 respectively.
Table 2. Fault signature table
Residual

Velocity sensor fault

Range sensor fault

𝑅1𝑖

1

1

𝑅2𝑖

1

0

4.3. Simulation studies
This subsection shows the results regarding the performance of Sensor Fault
Observers. Note that, the estimated value of the fault under fault occurrence is fed back to
the CACC controller to compensate for the fault effect. To evaluate the performance of the
proposed diagnostic scheme, two scenarios are considered:
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Scenario 1: A bias fault of 3 m/s is injected in the velocity sensor of vehicle 3 at
𝑡 = 450 𝑠. Fig. 9 illustrates the performance of the diagnostic scheme (Sensor Fault
Observers) under two cases: 1) typical CACC without the diagnostic scheme, 2) CACC
with the proposed diagnostic scheme. The first subplot of Fig.9 shows the injected velocity
sensor fault and the estimated value of this fault by the Sensor Fault Observer. In the second
subplot of Fig. 9, the relative distance between vehicle 3 and vehicle 2 is shown. It can be
seen from Fig. 9 that at least four crashes happen in this specific driving cycle under typical
CACC. However, applying the CACC with the proposed diagnostic scheme, these crashes
are avoided. Therefore, it can be concluded that the proposed diagnostic scheme is able to
improve the performance of the connected vehicle system.
Scenario 2: Similar to the velocity sensor’s fault scenario, a bias fault with
amplitude of 1.5 𝑚 is injected on range sensor at 𝑡 = 350 𝑠. Fig.10 illustrates the
performance of the diagnostic scheme (Sensor Fault Observers) under two cases: 1) typical
CACC without the diagnostic scheme, 2) CACC with the proposed diagnostic scheme. The
first subplot of Fig.10 shows the injected range sensor fault and the estimated value of this
fault by the Sensor Fault Observer. In the second subplot of Fig. 10, the relative distance
between vehicle 3 and vehicle 2 is shown. It can be seen from Fig. 10 that six crashes happen
in this specific driving cycle under typical CACC. However, applying the CACC with the
proposed diagnostic scheme, these crashes are avoided. Therefore, it can be concluded that
the proposed diagnostic scheme is able to improve the performance of the connected vehicle
system.
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Simulation Scenario: A homogenous platoon of five vehicles equipped with CACC
control strategy is considered. The leader of the platoon follows the scaled and modified
US06 driving cycle. Vehicle parameters are taken from [30] and [31]. The results are
illustrated as the follows.

Figure 9: (a) Injected and estimated velocity sensor bias fault. Fault amplitude 3 m/s
and injection time t=450 s. (b) Relative distance between vehicle 2 and vehicle 3 (𝑑3 )
under the velocity sensor fault. Two cases are considered: 1) typical CACC without the
diagnostic scheme, 2) CACC with the proposed diagnostic scheme.

Figure 10: (a) Injected and estimated range sensor bias fault. Fault amplitude 1.5 m
and injection time t=350 s. (b) Relative distance between vehicle 2 and vehicle 3 (𝑑3 )
under the range sensor fault. Two cases are considered: 1) typical CACC without the
diagnostic scheme, 2) CACC with the proposed diagnostic scheme.
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Remark 6: In case of having measurement on acceleration of the system, we can
isolate and estimate the actuator fault in the similar way.
Table 3. Fault signature table II
Residual

Velocity sensor fault

𝑅1𝑖
𝑅2𝑖

Range sensor fault

Actuator fault

1

1

0

1

0

1

Fig.11 shows the results of having fault in relative distance sensor, velocity sensor
and acceleration pedal sensor. In order to distinguish and estimate failure in actuator we
need measurement on acceleration pedal position. However, with lack information we still
can detect this failure too.
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Figure 11: Physical faults and failures signatures
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CHAPTER FIVE
RESILIENT STRATEGY TOWARD PACKET DROP OUT
In this section, we explore the problem of network failure simultaneously with onboard sensor faults for a connected vehicle system. A homogeneous platoon of vehicles
under Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC) strategy is considered as a case study
of connected vehicles. The aim of this section of the proposed research is to modify the
existing control strategy by adding a new modifying observer based strategy to estimate
the lost information due to the packet dropping of the communication network. This will
make the CACC controller robust to the packet drop out in the network. The proposed
scheme consists of two components: 1) a Kalman filter to reconstruct the data received via
unreliable communication network and by adding the fault diagnostics in previous section
we can have, 2) sensor fault observers based on sliding mode methodology to detect, isolate
and estimate the sensor faults under packet dropping phenomena.
5.1. Packet Dropping Modeling
Analyzing DSRC communication network [23],[110]-[111] with particular attention
of sending safety messages, we concluded that Bernoulli approach is a proper methodology
to model the packet dropping in DSRC network [15], [23]. Consider 𝑇𝑠 as the network
sampling time. The time instant 𝑘 is defined as 𝑘 × 𝑇𝑠 ≤ 𝑡 < (𝑘 + 1) × 𝑇𝑠 . Between each
sample time instant, the value of information received through the communication network
will be held.
In occurrence of packet drop out in the communication network, the control
dynamics (5) can be rewritten as the following:
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1

1

1

𝑢̇ 𝑖 = − ℎ 𝑢𝑖 + ℎ (𝑘𝑝 𝑒𝑖 + 𝑘𝑑 𝑒̇𝑖 ) + ℎ × 𝜒(𝑘) × 𝑢𝑖−1

(21)

where 𝜒(𝑘) a variable that represents the packet drop out phenomenon at time instant 𝑘.
The variable 𝜒 is modeled as a Bernoulli random variable. If the packet is delivered
correctly, we have 𝜒(𝑘) = 1; otherwise, if packet is lost in the network, we have 𝜒(𝑘) = 0.
Therefore, we can model packet drop out in the communication network as below:
𝜒(𝑘) ∈ {0,1}

(22)

where the probability of packet loss is 𝑝(𝜒(𝑘) = 0) = 𝜆 and the probability of successful
arrival of packet is 𝑝(𝜒(𝑘) = 1) = 1 − 𝜆.
Remark 7: With the probability of 𝜆, the packet in the network will be lost and the
vehicle receives no information on the preceding vehicle’s desired acceleration. With the
probability of 1 − 𝜆, the vehicle will receive correct data from the network
Assumption 2: Each vehicle in the platoon receives the desired acceleration data of
the preceding vehicle through DSRC network.
5.2. Proposed Strategy
The control policy of CACC strategy for vehicle 𝑖, shown in (5), depends on two
crucial sets of information: 1) desired acceleration of the preceding vehicle (𝑢𝑖−1) which is
received via communication network (Assumption 2) and, 2) velocity of vehicle 𝑖 (𝑣𝑖 ) and
the relative distance between vehicle 𝑖 and vehicle 𝑖 − 1 (𝑑𝑖 ), both of which are measured
by on-board sensors (Assumption 1). Therefore, data loss due to packet drop out in the
communication network, and faults in these on-board sensors, will affect the individual
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vehicle’s behavior and create potentially unsafe situations in the connected vehicle system.
In this section of proposed research, we propose a diagnostic scheme that improves the
performance of CACC in presence of these issues. The scheme is shown in Fig. 14. As it
can be inferred from the schematic, the diagnostic scheme has two components: Filter to
compensate the packet dropping and fault diagnostics which discussed in the previous
section

Figure 12: Packet dropping strategy for connected vehicles combined with physical
fault diagnostics
Filter 1: The objective of the Filter 1 is to receive the data from communication
network (DSRC) which is possibly subjected to packet drop and reconstruct the actual data
(𝑢𝑖−1 ) with certain accuracy. Filter 1 is essentially a Kalman filter which will be detailed
shortly.
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We take the following assumptions which facilitate the filter design.
Assumption 3: Vehicle 𝑖 receives the following information through the DSRC.
𝑑𝑖−1 : The relative distance of vehicle 𝑖 − 1.
𝑢𝑖−1 : The desire acceleration of vehicle 𝑖 − 1.
𝑑𝑖−2 : The relative distance of vehicle 𝑖 − 2.
𝑢𝑖−2 : The desire acceleration of vehicle 𝑖 − 2.
Assumption 4: Vehicle 𝑖 measures 𝑣𝑖−1 using its own velocity information and on
board relative velocity sensor data.
As mentioned before, the goal of Filter 1 is to reconstruct 𝑢𝑖−1 which is subjected
to packet drop out.
Considering the control policy (8) for vehicle 𝑖 − 1, the dynamics of 𝑢𝑖−1 can be
written as
1

1

1

𝑢̇ 𝑖−1 = − ℎ 𝑢𝑖−1 + ℎ (𝑘𝑝 𝑒𝑖−1 + 𝑘𝑑 𝑒̇𝑖−1 ) + ℎ 𝑢𝑖−2

(23)

where
𝑒𝑖−1 (𝑡) = 𝑑𝑖−1 (𝑡) − ℎ𝑣𝑖−1 (𝑡)

(24)

The structure of Filter 1, which is implemented in vehicle 𝑖, is chosen as:
1
1
1
𝑢̂̇𝑖−1 = − 𝑢̂𝑖−1 + (𝑘𝑝 𝑒̂𝑖−1 + 𝑘𝑑 𝑒̂̇𝑖−1 ) + 𝑢̂𝑖−2
ℎ
ℎ
ℎ
+𝐿𝐾 (𝑢𝑖−1 − 𝑢̂𝑖−1 )

(25)
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where LK is the Kalman gain and , 𝑑̂𝑖−1 and 𝑢̂𝑖−2 are defined as follows:
𝑑 ((𝑘 − 1)𝑇𝑠 ) 𝑖𝑓 𝜒(𝑘) = 0
𝑑̂𝑖−1 (𝑡) = { 𝑖−1
𝑑𝑖−1 (𝑘𝑇𝑠 )
𝑖𝑓 𝜒(𝑘) = 1
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑘𝑇𝑠 ≤ 𝑡 < (𝑘 + 1)𝑇𝑠

(26)

𝑢 ((𝑘 − 1)𝑇𝑠 ) 𝑖𝑓 𝜒(𝑘) = 0
𝑢̂𝑖−2 (𝑡) = { 𝑖−2
𝑢𝑖−2 (𝑘𝑇𝑠 )
𝑖𝑓 𝜒(𝑘) = 1
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑘𝑇𝑠 ≤ 𝑡 < (𝑘 + 1)𝑇𝑠

(27)

Note that, the variables 𝑑̂𝑖−1 and 𝑢̂𝑖−2 are the modified from the data 𝑑𝑖−1 and 𝑢𝑖−2,
received by vehicle 𝑖. Using the holding strategy, explained in (26)-(27), the error (24) in
presence of packet dropping will be:
𝑒̂𝑖−1 (𝑡) = 𝑑̂𝑖−1 (𝑡) − ℎ𝑣𝑖−1 (𝑡)

(28)

Assumption 5: The probability of having packet drop outs on consecutive time
instants 𝑡 = 𝑘𝑇𝑠 and 𝑡 = (𝑘 − 1)𝑇𝑠 is assumed to be negligible.
Subtracting (14) from (12), the filter estimation error dynamic can be written as:
1
𝑢̃̇𝑖−1 = − ℎ 𝑢̃𝑖−1 − 𝐿𝐾 𝑢̃𝑖−1 + 𝛥𝑢𝑃𝐷

(29)

𝑢̃𝑖−1 = 𝑢𝑖−1 − 𝑢̂𝑖−1

(30)

where 𝑢̃𝑖−1 is the estimation error, 𝛥𝑢𝑃𝐷 represents lumped effect of the
uncertainties due to packet drop outs, holding strategy (26)-(27) and measurement noise.
The Kalman gain 𝐿𝐾 is designed following the process detailed in [89]. In the design, the
uncertain term 𝛥𝑢𝑃𝐷 is considered as a bounded Gaussian process noise which can
potentially be suppressed by tuning the error covariance matrices.
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5.3. Simulation Studies
In this section, we present the simulation studies to verify the effectiveness of the
scheme.
Simulation Scenario: A homogenous platoon of five vehicles equipped with CACC
control strategy is considered. The leader of the platoon follows the scaled and modified
US06 driving cycle (Fig. 13). Performance of Filter 1 (Data reconstruction under packet
drop out). This subsection shows the results regarding the performance of Filter 1. It verifies
the effectiveness of the Filter 1 in reconstructing the actual data which is subjected to packet
drop outs. Furthermore, it also shows how CACC performance is improved by the addition
of Filter 1.

Figure 13. Velocity profile of US06 Driving cycle
The performance of the vehicle 𝑖 in the platoon can be evaluated by considering its
relative distance 𝑑𝑖 with respect to the preceding vehicle. The CACC strategy attempts to
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keep the relative distance very small to enhance the traffic throughput. However, failure in
the communication network may cause degraded performance in CACC and consequently,
lead to crashes. The relative distance 𝑑𝑖 should be greater than zero to avoid crashes between
two consecutive vehicles.
In this simulation study, the relative distance between vehicle 3 and vehicle 2 is used
to illustrate the scheme. Fig. 14 shows the relative distance in the presence of packet drop
outs with different probabilities. Note that, the vehicles are not equipped with the proposed
scheme and only have typical CACC. It can be seen from Fig. 14 that under higher packet
drop out probabilities, the relative distance between vehicle 2 and 3 becomes negative
indicating crashes.
Next, we evaluate the proposed scheme where the vehicles are equipped with
diagnostic scheme (Filter 1). A network with probability of packet drop out 𝜆 = 0.2 is
considered. Fig.15 shows the relative distance of vehicle 2 and vehicle 3 under two cases:
1) typical CACC without the diagnostic scheme, 2) CACC with the proposed diagnostic
scheme. It can be seen from Fig. 15 that at least four crashes happen in this specific driving
cycle under typical CACC. However, applying the CACC with the proposed diagnostic
scheme, these crashes are avoided. Therefore, it can be concluded that the proposed
diagnostic scheme is able to improve the performance of the connected vehicle system.
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Figure 14: Relative distance between vehicle 2 and vehicle 3 (𝑑3 ), with different
probabilities of packet drop out in the communication network.

Figure 15: Relative distance between vehicle 2 and vehicle 3 (𝑑3 ) with the probability
of packet drop out 𝜆 = 0.2, under two cases: 1) typical CACC without the diagnostic
scheme, 2) CACC with the proposed diagnostic scheme.
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CHAPTER SIX
RESILIENT STRATEGIES TOWARD DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACK
In cyber physical systems such as connected vehicles, DoS attack changes the
average service time of the communication network by imposing illegitimate requests.
Indeed, the DoS attack induces an additional service time which in turn corresponds to
additional delay in the transmission network [42]. In the majority of the existing control
frameworks, the effect of DoS attack has been modelled in two ways: (i) stochastic time
delay which can be represented by random variables e.g. Bernoulli [41] or probabilistic
approaches with memory e.g Markov Model [90] ; (ii) constant time delay [42]. In this
chapter, our main case study is connected vehicle system with Co-operative Adaptive Cruise
Control (CACC). We develop three different strategies to detect and estimate the effect of
DoS attack as time-delay. In the first algorithm, we model the DoS attack with stochastic
time delay in DSRC network. We propose a strategy to estimate the mean value of the delay
as well as estimating correct value of signal subjected to the delay to modify the CACC
algorithm correspondingly to maintain the functionality of the platoon. In the second
strategy, we model DoS attack in DSRC with as constant unknown delay and proposed an
adaptive observer to estimate the delay. Also, we studied the effects of system uncertainties
on the DoS estimation algorithm. Finally, in the third algorithm, we considered a general
CPS system with a saturated DoS attack modeled with constant unknown delay. In this part
we modeled DoS via a PDE and developed a PDE based observer and an adaptive observer
to estimate the delay as well as states of the system while the only available measurements
are delayed.
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6.1. Strategy Number One

In this section we consider DoS attack in DSRC which degrades the quality of
packet delivery of the communication network. To countermeasure the DoS attack in the
platoon system, the conventional CACC algorithm is modified by adding an estimation
algorithm consisting of two Luenberger observers and a delay estimator. The effectiveness
of the overall online algorithm scheme is verified via simulation studies. The developed
scheme is a new contribution to connected vehicles security research area with the following
characteristics: 1) Considers stochastic delay to model the effect of DoS attack in connected
vehicles as an example of CPS, 2) Theoretical verification of the convergence of the state
estimation error, 3) Theoretical verification of delay estimation, and 4) Simple design and
computationally efficient.
6.1.1 DoS Attack Modeling
In this section we simplified the model of the platoon by considering the following
dynamic controller is considered to achieve the zero regulation error:
1
1
1
ai   ai  (k p ei  kd ei )  ai 1
h
h
h

ai 

kp
h

di  (k p 

(31)

kd
k
1
1
)vi  (k p  )ai  d vi 1  ai 1
h
h
h
h

(32)

where 𝑎𝑖−1 and 𝑣𝑖−1 are the desired acceleration and velocity of the preceding vehicle
received through DSRC network. The parameters 𝐾𝑝 , 𝐾𝑑 > 0 are controller gains designed
such that (i) the inter-vehicle distance is maintained to 𝑑𝑟,𝑖 and (ii) the 𝑎𝑖 is bounded and
changes smoothly. As it can be inferred from (32), control signal of vehicle 𝑖 derived from
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CACC algorithm, 𝑎𝑖 , depends on states of vehicle 𝑖 and information received from
preceding vehicle 𝑖 − 1.
Considering (1) and (6), a new augmented state space representation for vehicle 𝑖
is shown in (33), where, 𝑎𝑖−1 and 𝑣𝑖−1 are two external inputs of the system related to the
preceding vehicle 𝑖 − 1.
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 h
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(33)

Remark 8: Vehicle 𝑖 receives the absolute velocity, 𝑣𝑖−1 and acceleration
information of preceding vehicle, 𝑎𝑖−1 , through DSRC network. Hence, these signals are
subjected to network failures and cyber-attacks.
We can write (33) in the form of general state space representation as (8) considering
that all states of the system are measured via on-board sensors.
xi (t )  Axi (t )  Bui 1 (t )
yi (t )  Cxi (t )

(34)

where 𝑥𝑖 = [𝑑𝑖 , 𝑣𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 ]𝑇 ∈ 𝑅 3 , represents the states of vehicle 𝑖. 𝑢𝑖−1 = [𝑣𝑖−1 , 𝑎𝑖−1 ]𝑇 ∈
𝑅 2 are external inputs of the system coming from vehicle 𝑖 − 1, and 𝑦𝑖 = [𝑑𝑖 , 𝑣𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 ]𝑇 ∈
𝑅 3 stands for measureable outputs of the system.
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Denial of Service (DoS) Attack
Denial of service attack is a cyber-attack that affects the timeliness of information
exchange. In this section of proposed research, DoS attack is modeled as a stochastic delay
on data transmission time in the network. We consider each vehicle updates its data for
transmission periodically [15]-[16]. Fig.16 shows the packet transmission in ideal network
and network under DoS attack.
If there is no attack in the communication network, the packet is delivered with no
delay. However, in presence of DoS, the attacker increases the service time of the network
and keeps the network busy. Consequently, vehicle 𝑖 will not receive the new information
of vehicle 𝑖 − 1, to update its own information. Therefore, vehicle 𝑖 holds the previous data
of vehicle 𝑖 − 1 [15]-[16],[10] .
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Figure 16: Modeling of Denial of Service attack on signal 𝑎𝑖−1
Consider 𝑝 as the probability of network being idle to transmit a packet and 𝑞 =
(1 − 𝑝) as the probability of network being busy. The impact of DoS attack can be modeled
as a stochastic delay as the following:
𝜏 = 𝑙∆𝑇 < 𝑑 = 𝑙𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∆𝑇, 𝑙 ∈ {1,2, … , 𝑙𝑚𝑎𝑥 }

(35)

where ∆𝑇 is the sample time of updating safety messages in vehicles. Therefore, the
probability distribution of delay 𝜏 can be defined using Bernoulli random variable
𝑃(𝜏 = 0) = 𝑝
𝑃(𝜏 = ∆𝑇) = 𝑝 × (1 − 𝑝)

(36)

𝑃(𝜏 = 𝑖 × ∆𝑇) = 𝑝 × (1 − 𝑝)𝑖
The 𝑝 depends on the DoS attacker capability to keep network busy. Since the DoS
attack increases the service time [42] and consequently𝑞, in presence of the attack, the
probability of finding network idle will be reduced.
In presence of attack the dynamic of the vehicle 𝑖 will change as (37)
xi (t )  Axi (t )  Bui 1 (t   )
yi (t )  Cxi (t )

(37)

where 𝜏 is stochastic delay.
Assumption 6: The attacker has a limited access to increase the service time of the
network [42]. Hence, the injected delay in data transmission is bounded with an upper limit
of 𝜏𝑚𝑎𝑥
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6.1.2. Diagnostics Algorithm
Transmitted data 𝑢𝑖−1 , is subjected to DoS attack and hence affected by the
stochastic delay in the network. The stochastic delay in the receiving data can diminish the
performance of platoon and cause collisions. Hence, to avoid collisions and enhance the
performance of platoon, a precise estimation of actual 𝑢𝑖−1 is required. The estimated 𝑢𝑖−1
can be used in CACC strategy instead of actual 𝑢𝑖−1 under DoS attack. This strategy can be
called modified CACC. To achieve this goal, an estimation algorithm containing three
components is proposed: (1) Observer I estimates the states of the preceding car in normal
condition. The output error of the observer I is used as a residual signal to detect the attack.
(2) Observer II estimates the states of the preceding car with certain accuracy in presence
DoS attack. These estimates are used in the modified CACC strategy. (3) Delay estimator
estimates the stochastic delay induced by DoS. The schematic of the online estimation
scheme is shown in Fig. 17.
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Figure 17: DoS strategy schematic for connected vehicles to modify CACC
In brief, observer I estimates the states of preceding vehicle in ideal case when there
is no delay in communication network. In occurrence of DoS, the residual of this observer
will be non-zero, detects the DoS attack. Therefore, system switches to observer II and delay
estimator to estimate the states of preceding vehicle accurately even in presence of DoS.
Real time measurements from vehicle 𝑖 − 1 are 𝑑𝑖−1 , 𝑣𝑖−1 , 𝑎𝑖−1 and inputs for both
observers are states of vehicle 𝑖 − 2 𝑣𝑖−2 , 𝑎𝑖−2 which are received through DSRC under
stochastic delay.
Observer I
Assumption 7: There is no sensor faults in the on-board sensors.
Similar to (34), dynamics of vehicle 𝑖 − 1 can be written as:
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x(t )  Ax(t )  Bu (t )
y (t )  Cx(t )

(38)

where 𝑥 = [𝑑𝑖−1 , 𝑣𝑖−1 , 𝑎𝑖−1 ]𝑇 ∈ 𝑅 3 , represents the states of vehicle 𝑖 − 1. 𝑢 =
[𝑣𝑖−2 , 𝑎𝑖−2 ]𝑇 ∈ 𝑅 2 are inputs of the system and 𝑦 = [𝑑𝑖−1 , 𝑣𝑖−1 , 𝑎𝑖−1 ]𝑇 ∈ 𝑅 3stands for
measureable outputs of the system.
A Luenberger observer can be designed as (39) and implemented in vehicle 𝑖:
xˆ (t )  Axˆ (t )  Bu (t )  L1  ym (t )  yˆ (t ) 

(39)

where 𝑦𝑚 (𝑡) is the transmitted measurements of vehicle 𝑖 − 1 including relative distance,
velocity and acceleration. In ideal network with no DoS attack,
ym (t )  Cx(t )

(40)

Therefore, error dynamics is derived as:
x(t )  Ax(t )  L1Cx(t )

(41)

The observer gain, 𝐿1 , is selected such that the estimation error 𝑥̃(𝑡) , with dynamics
of (41), converges to zero exponentially. To do this, 𝐴 − 𝐿1 𝐶 should be negative definite
matrix. The residual 𝑆1 is defined as
𝑆1 (𝑡) = 𝑦𝑚 (𝑡) − 𝑦̂ (𝑡) = 𝐶(𝑥𝑚 (𝑡) − 𝑥̂ (𝑡))

(42)

In occurrence of DoS attack, since the estimated value is not equal with the
measurement due to the delay, the residual will be non-zero. This residual is used as an
indicator of DoS attack in the network.
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Observer II
Assumption 8: DSRC is a shared communicating network. Therefore, in presence
of attack in the network, all exchanging data experience the same delay on the same
time, 𝜏(𝑡) ∈ {𝜏 | 𝑝(𝜏) < 1 , 0 ≤ 𝜏 ≤ 𝑑}.
Assumption 9: The derivative of vehicle acceleration is bounded.
In presence of DoS attack, since vehicle 𝑖 receives the measurement of vehicle 𝑖 − 1
through the DSRC network, (38) can be re-written as (43)
x(t )  Ax(t )  Bu (t   )
y (t )  Cx(t )

(43)

Considering the mentioned assumptions, the observer dynamics is given as:
xˆ (t )  Axˆ (t )  Bu (t   )  L  ym (t )  yˆ (t  ˆ) 

(44)

where 𝜏̂ is the mean value of estimated delay derived from delay estimator explained in the
next section. 𝑦𝑚 (𝑡) is the transmitted measurements of vehicle 𝑖 − 1 .These information are
transferred from vehicle 𝑖 − 1 through the DSRC network which is subjected to delay 𝜏.
Therefore, the received measurements of vehicle 𝑖 − 1 in the vehicle 𝑖 have delay of 𝜏
seconds as it is described in (45).
ym (t )  y(t   )

(45)

Consequently, the error dynamics can be written as (46)
x(t )  Ax(t )  LC  x(t   )  xˆ (t  ˆ) 

(46)
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x(t )  Ax(t )  LC  x(t   )   M (t )

(47)

With initial condition
𝑥̃(𝑡0 ) = 𝑥̃0

(48)

where 𝑀(𝑡) represents the lumped noise and uncertainties caused by error in estimating the
delay. It is assumed that 𝑀(𝑡)is bounded as:
|𝑀[𝑡0 ,𝑡∞] | < 𝐾. ∆

(49)

∞

The upper bound of the uncertainty can be derived from the driving cycle, maximum
delay and maximum permitted acceleration.
Remark 9: The error dynamics (47) is stable and converges to a bounded region
exponentially, if there exists 𝐿 matrix such that the following Lyapunov-Krasovskii function
satisfies Proposition 1 [99].
𝑡

𝑉(𝑡, 𝑥̃, 𝑥̃̇) = 𝑥̃ 𝑇 (𝑡)𝑃𝑥̃(𝑡) + ∫

𝑡−d

0

𝑡

+ d∫ ∫
−d

𝑡+𝜃

𝑒 𝑎(𝑠−𝑡) 𝑥̃ 𝑇 (𝑠)𝑆𝑥̃(𝑠)𝑑𝑠

𝑒 𝑎(𝑠−𝑡) 𝑥̃̇ 𝑇 (𝑠)𝑅𝑥̃̇ (𝑠)𝑑𝑠 𝑑𝜃

(50)

Proposition 1: If there exist 𝑎 > 0, 𝑏 > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 3 × 3 − 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝑃 > 0, 𝑆 >
0, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅 > 0 such that along trajectories of (47) the Lyapunov-Krasovskii function (50)
satisfies the condition (51)
𝑑

𝑊 =∆𝑎𝑉 − 𝑏|𝑀|2 + 𝑑𝑡 𝑉 < 0

(51)

Then the solution of (21) with initial condition of 𝑥̃(𝑡0 ) = 𝑥̃0 satisfies the inequality
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𝑏

𝑥̃ 𝑇 (𝑡)𝑃𝑥̃(𝑡) < 𝑒 −𝑎(𝑡−𝑡0 ) 𝑥̃0𝑇 𝑃𝑥̃0 + [1 − 𝑒 −𝑎(𝑡−𝑡0 ) ] 𝑎 |𝑀[𝑡0 ,𝑡∞] |

2
∞

(52)

Proof: Applying comparison principle [78], we have
𝑡

𝑥̃ 𝑇 (𝑡)𝑃𝑥̃(𝑡) ≤ 𝑉(𝑡, 𝑥̃𝑡 , 𝑥̃𝑡̇ ) < 𝑒 −𝑎(𝑡−𝑡0 ) 𝑉(𝑡, 𝑥̃𝑡0 , 𝑥̃𝑡0̇ ) + ∫𝑡 𝑒 −𝑎(𝑡−𝑠) 𝑏|𝑀(𝑠)|2 𝑑𝑠
0

(53)

We find
𝑊 ≤ 2𝑥̃ 𝑇 (𝑡)𝑃𝑥̃̇ (𝑡) + 𝑎𝑥̃ 𝑇 (𝑡)𝑃𝑥̃(𝑡) − 𝑏𝑀𝑇 (𝑡)𝑀(𝑡)
𝑡
2 ̇ 𝑇 (𝑡)𝑅𝑥̇ (

+ 𝑑 𝑥̃

̃ 𝑡) − 𝑑𝑒

−𝑎𝑑

∫ 𝑥̃̇ 𝑇 (𝑠)𝑅𝑥̃̇ (𝑠)𝑑𝑠 + 𝑥̃ 𝑇 (𝑡)𝑆𝑥̃(𝑡)
𝑡−𝑑

− [𝑥̃ 𝑇 (𝑡 − ℎ)𝑆(𝑥̃(𝑡 − ℎ)]𝑒 −𝑎𝑑
(54)
Applying the standard arguments, we obtain that
𝑊 ≤ 𝜂𝑇 (𝑡)Φη(𝑡) < 0

∀η(𝑡) ≠ 0

(55)

where
η(𝑡) = 𝑐𝑜𝑙 {𝑥̃(𝑡), 𝑥̃̇(𝑡), 𝑥̃(𝑡 − 𝑑), 𝑥̃(𝑡 − 𝜏(𝑡)), 𝑀(𝑡)} if the matrix inequality
𝜙11
∗
𝛷= ∗
∗
[ ∗

𝜙12
𝜙22
∗
∗
∗

0
0
−(𝑆 + 𝑅)𝑒 −𝑎𝑑
∗
∗

𝑃2𝑇 𝐴1 + Re−𝑎𝑑
𝑃3𝑇 𝐴1
𝑅𝑒 −𝑎𝑑
−2𝑅𝑒 −𝑎𝑑
∗

𝑃2𝑇
𝑃3𝑇
0 𝛷<0
0
−𝑏𝐼 ]

(56)

is feasible, where
𝐴1 = −𝐿𝐶
𝜙11 = 𝐴𝑇 𝑃2 + 𝑃2𝑇 + 𝑎𝑃 + 𝑆 − Re−𝑎𝑑

(57)
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𝜙12 = 𝑃 − 𝑃2𝑇 + 𝐴𝑇 𝑃3

(58)

𝜙22 = −𝑃3 − 𝑃3𝑇 + 𝑑2 𝑅

(59)

Thus, the following results will be obtained
Lemma 1. Given 𝑎 > 0, 𝑏 > 0 , 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑑 > 0 , let there exist 3 × 3 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝑃 >
0, 𝑃2 , 𝑃3 , 𝑆 > 0, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅 > 0 such that the LMI (56) with notation given in (57)-(59) holds.
Then the solution of (47) satisfies (50) for all delays 0 ≤ 𝜏(𝑡) ≤ 𝑑. Moreover, the ellipsoid
𝜒∞ = {𝑥̃ ∈ 𝑅 3 : 𝑥̃ 𝑇 (𝑡)𝑃𝑥̃(𝑡) <

𝑏
𝑎

𝐾 2 . ∆2 }

(60)

is exponentially attractive with the decay rate a/2 for all |𝑀(𝑡)|2 ≤ 𝐾 2 . ∆2 .
Delay Estimator
To estimate states of preceding vehicle, the observer needs estimated average value
of delay. We define the following residual
𝑆2 (𝑡) = 𝑦𝑚 (𝑡) − 𝑦̂(𝑡 − 𝜏̂ ) = 𝑦(𝑡 − 𝜏) − 𝑦̂(𝑡 − 𝜏̂ )

(61)

By discretizing the residual, (61) can be re-written as
𝑟𝑘 = 𝑆2 (𝑘. ∆𝑇) = 𝑦(𝑘. ∆𝑇 − 𝜏) − 𝑦̂(𝑘. ∆𝑇 − 𝑙̂∆𝑇)

(62)

𝑟𝑘 = 𝑦(𝑘 − 𝑙) − 𝑦̂(𝑘 − 𝑙̂)

(63)

Assume that we have observed the data set 𝑟 = {𝑟1 , 𝑟2 , … , 𝑟𝑘 } and we want to
estimate the average value of stochastic delay. Since in section III, we have proven that the
estimation error converges to a bounded area, we can assume obtained residual is a
stationary Gaussian random process [80], with mean 𝜇 and variance 𝜎
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𝑟𝑘 ~𝒩(𝜇, 𝜎𝑘 )

(64)

Considering (47), we can write:
𝑟𝑘+1 = 𝐴𝑟𝑘 − 𝐿𝐶𝑟𝑘−𝑙 + 𝑀𝑘

(65)

𝐸(𝑟𝑘+1 ) = 𝐴. 𝐸(𝑟𝑘 ) − 𝐿𝐶. 𝐸(𝑟𝑘−𝑙 ) + 𝐸(𝑀𝑘 )

(66)

where 𝐸(. ) is the expectation operator. Since 𝑀 is assumed to be zero mean white noise,
the expected value of 𝑟 will be
𝐸(𝑟𝑘+1 ) = 𝐸(𝑟𝑘 ) = 𝜇 = 0

𝑎𝑠

𝑘→∞

(67)

Furthermore,
2
2 )
𝐸(𝑟𝑘+1
) = 𝐴2 𝐸(𝑟𝑘2 ) + 𝐿2 𝐶 2 𝐸(𝑟𝑘−𝑙
+ 2𝐴𝐿𝐶𝐸(𝑟𝑘 . 𝑟𝑘−𝑙 ) + 𝐸(𝑀𝑘2 )

(68)

Based on the definition of the variance of a signal, we have
2
2
𝜎𝑘+1
= 𝐸(𝑟𝑘+1
) − 𝐸(𝑟𝑘+1 )2

(69)

Substituting (40) and (42) in (43), the following equation can be derived:
2
2
2
𝜎𝑘+1
= 𝐴2 𝜎𝑘2 + 𝐿2 𝐶 2 𝜎𝑘−1
+ 2𝐴𝐿𝐶𝐸(𝑟𝑘 . 𝑟𝑘−𝑙 ) + 𝜎𝑀

(70)

Considering we have enough observation on 𝑟, as 𝑘 → ∞, we have
2
2
𝜎𝑘+1
= 𝜎𝑘2 = 𝜎𝑘−𝑙
= 𝜎2

(71)

Therefore, we can write
2
𝜎𝑘2 = (𝐴2 + 𝐿2 𝐶 2 )𝜎𝑘2 + 2𝐴𝐿𝐶𝑅𝑟 (𝑟𝑘 . 𝑟𝑘−𝑙 ) + 𝜎𝑀
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(72)

Since 𝑟 = {𝑟1 , 𝑟2 , … , 𝑟𝑘 } is Gaussian wide sense stationary signal, the correlation is related
to delay as
𝑅𝑟 (𝑙) = 𝜎 2 𝑒 −|𝑙|/∆𝑇

(73)

Substituting (45) and (47) in (46), we have:
2
𝜎 2 = (𝐴2 + 𝐿2 𝐶 2 )𝜎 2 + 2𝐴𝐿𝐶𝜎 2 𝑒 −|𝑙|/∆𝑇 + 𝜎𝑀

(74)

|𝑙|

2
(𝐼 − 𝐴2 − 𝐿2 𝐶 2 )𝜎 2 − 𝜎𝑀
= 2𝐴𝐿𝐶𝜎 2 𝑒 −∆𝑇
2
(𝐼−𝐴2 −𝐿2 𝐶 2 )𝜎2 −𝜎𝑀

2𝐴𝐿𝐶𝜎2

(75)

|𝑙|

= 𝑒 −∆𝑇

(76)
2

2𝐴𝐿𝐶𝜎
𝑙̂ = |𝑙| = ∆𝑇. 𝐿𝑛 ((𝐼−𝐴2−𝐿2 𝐶 2 )𝜎2 −𝜎2 )

(77)

𝑀

Using the probability distribution of 𝑟 and measuring the variance of residual, we can
measure the delay 𝑙 and have an approximation of total delay 𝜏 = ∆𝑇. 𝑙.
Therefore, we can write
𝜏̂ = ∆𝑇. 𝑙̂

(78)

Every sample time, using the updated 𝜏 and updated estimation and new
observation, all calculation will be updated. Note that, better estimation of the delay, reduces
the uncertainties boundary in (47) and (49).
6.1.3. Results and Discussion
In this section, we simulate a homogenous platoon of 5 vehicles equipped with
CACC strategy. Vehicle 1 as the leader of platoon, follows UDDS driving cycle.
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Considering ℎ = 0.3 𝑠 and tuning the controller to track the desire relative distance, the
nominal system will have the following matrices:
0
𝐴=[ 0
3.33

−1
0
0
1 ],
−4.33 −4.33

1
𝐵=[ 0
3.33

0
0 ],
3.33

𝐶 = 𝐼3×3
We consider vehicle 3 as a case study to demonstrate the results. In vehicle 3, the
external input signal is 𝑢2 = [𝑣2 , 𝑎2 ] 𝑇 coming from vehicle 2 through the DSRC. The
parameters 𝐿, 𝑎 > 0, 𝑏 > 0 are chosen as
0.15 0.15
0
𝐿=[ 1
0.1
0.1] , 𝑎 = 1 , 𝑏 = 2
0.1 −0.15 0.1
These values are selected such that the LMI in (24) is satisfied and matrix Φ is
negative definite. Solving the LMI the following positive definite matrixes are obtained.
2.0101
𝑃1 = [−1.8057
−2.2541

−1.8057
1.6804
2.0358

−2.2541
2.0358 ]
2.5418

2.5974
𝑃2 = [−2.1479
−2.2241

−2.1479
2.1467
2.0514

−2.2241
2.0514 ]
2.3303

0.7698
𝑃3 = [0.3989
0.0589
1.5109
𝑆 = [ −1.3036
−1.05442

0.3989
0.3689
0.0123
−1.3036
1.1607
1.3589
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0.0589
0.0123]
0.0743
−1.05442
1.3589 ]
1.6182

0.4951
𝑅 = [0.2406
0.0599

0.2406
0.2143
0.0618

0.0599
0.0618]
1.6182

To simulate DoS attack in the platoon, a Bernoulli random variable with probability
of success 𝑝 = 0.5 is considered. The corresponding delay in injected as the DoS attack into
the communication network at 𝑡 = 300 𝑠𝑒𝑐 and remains in the system. In occurrence of
DoS attack, the states of vehicle 2 consisting 𝑣2 and 𝑎2 are estimated by proposed observer
II and delay estimator. The modified CACC strategy, uses the estimated 𝑢̂2 = [𝑣̂2 , 𝑎̂2 ]
instead of actual one. Hence, the performance of platoon in presence of DoS enhances.
Fig.18 shows the states of vehicle 3, relative distance (𝑑3 ) velocity (𝑣3 ) and acceleration
(𝑎3 ) in different scenarios. Solid blue curves represent the states of vehicle 3 in indeal case
with no DoS attack in the communication network. Solid red curves show states of vehicle
3 in occurrence of the DoS attack injected at 𝑡 = 300 𝑠𝑒𝑐 when the normal CACC is
applied as control strategy. Finally, the green curves represent the states of vehicle 3 in
presence of DoS attack when modified CACC control strategy uses the estimated states of
vehicle 2.
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Figure 18: States of vehicle 3, 𝑑3 , 𝑣3 and 𝑎3 in ideal network (blue), under attack with
normal CACC (red), with modified CACC which uses estimated signals of vehicle 2
𝑢̂2 = [𝑣̂2 , 𝑎̂2 ]

Figure 19: States of vehicle 3, zoomed results for 𝑡 = [290 350], before occurrence of
DoS and after that.
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To visualize the results better, Fig. 19 depicts the zoomed area of results for the
time interval𝑡 = [ 290, 350]. As it can be inferred from Fig.18 and Fig.19, in presence of
DoS attack, due to the delay in the receiving data, the relative distance in several points is
less than critical safety distance. However, using correct estimation, platoon has better
performance which is close to ideal case

6.2. Strategy Number Two
The main contribution of the present section is a control-oriented diagnostic
framework for connected vehicle systems that is capable of (i) detecting the occurrence
of DoS attack and, (ii) providing an estimate of the effect of the attack. Note that,
the estimate of the effect of the attack can be extremely useful for designing secure
control system for the vehicles. In this section we model the DoS attack by a time
delay in information processing by the network. The DoS detection scheme consists of
a set of observers designed by combining adaptive estimation and sliding mode theory.
Essentially, the goal of the scheme is to track the delay in the information processing
by the DSRC. When the delay exceeds a pre-defined threshold, a DoS occurrence is
detected. The pre-defined threshold is computed offline considering the modeling,
measurement and communication uncertainties. The scheme also estimates the delay
providing an estimate of the effect of DoS. This estimated delay can be used for updating
(modifying) the safety relative distance to avoid collision.
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6.2.1. DoS Attack Modeling
In this section, we assume the DoS attacker focuses on the endpoint (the following
vehicle) and flood the communication network with excessive amount of packets; therefore,
the authorized user (vehicle 𝑖) cannot access to the DSRC network on time and the
acceleration data of the leading vehicle 𝑖 − 1 will be delivered to the follower with a delay.
Since the capability of the attacker is not known, in this section, the delay induced by DoS
attack is modeled as unknown constant delay. Considering Remark 1, dynamics of vehicle
𝑖 in (\ref{vehicle}) under DoS attack can be written as
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 di (t ) 
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(79)

where vehicle 𝑖 receives the acceleration information of vehicle 𝑖 − 1 with unknown delay
induced by DoS attack, 𝜏.
Assumption 10: The attacker has a limited capability to keep the network busy. Hence, the
effect of DoS attack as the unknown delay has an upper bound corresponding to the
maximum capability of the attacker. i.e. 𝜏 ∈ [0, 𝜏𝑚𝑎𝑥 ].
Assumption 11: We consider a homogeneous platoon of vehicles. Therefore, all vehicles
in the platoon have the same parameters e.g. mass, inertia, rolling resistance coefficient.
Assumption 12: Each vehicle in the platoon measures relative distance with respect to
preceding vehicle 𝑑𝑖 and following vehicle 𝑑𝑖+1.
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Remark 10: Vehicle 𝑖 measures the relative velocity via radar and hence can compute the
absolute velocity 𝑣𝑖−1 of vehicle 𝑖 − 1. Vehicle 𝑖 also receives acceleration 𝑎i−1
information of vehicle 𝑖 − 1 via DSRC network which is subjected to network failures and
cyber-attacks.
6.2.2. Real-time Detection and Estimation Scheme for DoS Attack
With the formulation discussed in the previous section, the diagnostic problem is to detect
when the delay parameter 𝜏 is non-zero and if so, estimate the value of 𝜏. The detection
and estimation scheme for DoS attack is presented in Fig. 20.
Remark 11: The DoS detection module is implemented in vehicle 𝑖 − 1. As
mentioned in the previous section, vehicle 𝑖 − 1 has access to the following information: (i)
𝑑𝑖 (𝑡) and 𝑣𝑖 (𝑡) measured by rear radar of vehicle 𝑖 − 1 and, (ii) 𝑎𝑖 (𝑡) directly measured in
vehicle 𝑖 − 1. Note that, these measurements are not affected by the occurrence of the DoS
attack.

Figure 20. DoS attack detection and estimation scheme.
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The proposed scheme consists of a model-based observer, denoted by Vehicle i
Observer. Based on the available measurements and the model (79), Vehicle i Observer
detects the occurrence and estimates size of the delay𝜏. Before detailing the design of the
Vehicle i Observer, we make the following assumptions.
Assumption 13: The signal 𝑎𝑖−1 (𝑡) is at least two times differentiable with respect
to time. Furthermore, the derivative is bounded by some finite value, i.e. |𝑎̇ 𝑖−1 (𝑡)| <
𝑎̅𝑑 , ∀𝑡 > 0
Assumption 14: Using Taylor's series expansion [91], the delayed signal
𝑎𝑖−1 (𝑡 − 𝜏)can be written as

ai 1 (t   )  ai 1 (t )  ai 1 (t )  H .O.T

(80)

where 𝐻. 𝑂. 𝑇 represents the higher order terms of the Taylor's series expansion. We
assume that $H.O.T$ is negligible and hence 𝑎𝑖−1 (𝑡 − 𝜏) ≈ 𝑎𝑖−1 (𝑡) − 𝜏𝑎̇ 𝑖−1 (𝑡).
DoS Attack Detection
Applying Assumption 14, the system dynamics (79) can be written as:

di (t )  vi 1 (t )  vi (t )

(81)

vi (t )  ai (t )

(82)

ai (t ) 

kp
h

di (t )  (k p 

kd
)vi (t )  (k p  1 )ai (t )  kd vi1 (t )  1 (ai1 (t )  ai1 (t ) )),
h
h
h
h
(83)

We choose the following structure for Vehicle i Observer.
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vˆi (t )  Lv sgn(vi (t )  vˆi (t ))

aˆi (t ) 

kp
h

di (t )  (k p 

(84)

kd
)vˆi (t )  (k p  1 ) (t )  kd vi 1 (t )
h
h
h

1
 (ai 1 (t )  ai 1 (t )ˆ)  La ( (t )  aˆi (t )),
h

ˆ(t )  

Lb
ai 1 (t )( (t )  aˆi (t ))
h

(85)

(86)

where 𝑣̂𝑖 (𝑡), and 𝑎̂𝑖 (𝑡) are the estimated relative velocity and acceleration, respectively;
𝜏̂ (𝑡) is the estimated delay; 𝐿𝑣 , 𝐿𝑎 , 𝐿𝑏 are the constant observer gains to be designed;
𝑣𝑖−1 (𝑡) and 𝑎𝑖−1 (𝑡)are measured via on-board sensors in Vehicle i-1; 𝑑𝑖 (𝑡) and 𝑣𝑖 (𝑡)are
measured by Vehicle i-1 using radar; 𝜂 is a filtered version of the signal 𝐿𝑣 𝑠𝑔𝑛(𝑣𝑖 (𝑡) −
𝑣̂𝑖 (𝑡). Next, we state the main result of the proposed approach.
Main Result: Consider the system model described in (81)-(83), and the observer
structure (84)-(86). If the assumptions 13-14 hold true, then the estimated value of DoS
attack, 𝜏̂ (𝑡), converges to its true value 𝜏, as 𝑡 → ∞, given the the observer gains satisfy the
following conditions:

La , Lb  0

(87)

Lv  ai (t )  0, t  0

(88)

Proof: Subtracting (84)-(85) from (82)-(83), we can write the error dynamics of the
observer as:
vi (t )  ai (t )  Lv sgn(vi (t ))

(89)
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ai (t )  (k p 

kd
)vi (t )  (k p  1 )(ai (t )  (t ))  1 ai 1 (t ) (t )  La ( (t )  aˆi (t )),
h
h
h

where 𝐿𝑣 𝑠𝑔𝑛(𝑣𝑖 (𝑡) − 𝑣̂𝑖 (𝑡), 𝑎̃𝑖 (𝑡) = 𝑎𝑖 (𝑡) − 𝑎̂𝑖 (𝑡) and 𝜏̃ (𝑡) = 𝜏(𝑡) − 𝜏̂ (𝑡)

(90)
are the

estimation errors. We start with analyzing (89) by choosing the following Lyapunov
1

function candidate𝑉𝑣 (𝑡) = 2 𝑣̃𝑖2 (𝑡). The derivative of the Lyapunov function candidate can
be written as:
.

.

Vv (t )  vi (t ) v i (t )  vi (t )ai (t )  Lv vi (t ) sgn(vi (t ))

(91)

Applying the inequality 𝐴𝐵 ≤ |𝐴||𝐵| on the first term of the right hand side of (91),
we can write
.

Vv (t )  vi (t ) ai (t )  Lv vi (t )  vi (t ) ( ai (t )  Lv )

(92)
.

If the observer gain is such that 𝐿𝑣 > |𝑎𝑖 (𝑡)| > 0, ∀𝑡 ≥ 0, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑉𝑣 (𝑡) ≤ 0, and
hence we can write:
.

Vv (t )   Vv (t )

(93)

where 𝛼 = min√2(𝐿𝑣 − |𝑎𝑖 (𝑡)|) ≥ 0. The solution of the differential inequality
𝑡≥0

2

𝛼

(\ref{Lyap3}) is given by 𝑉𝑣 (𝑡) ≤ (− 2 𝑡 + √𝑉𝑣 (0)) . Therefore, we can conclude that
.

2

𝑉𝑣 (𝑡) → 0 after some finite time 𝑡𝑓 < 𝛼 √𝑉𝑣 (0). After 𝑡 > 𝑡𝑓 , we have 𝑉𝑣 (𝑡) = 0, 𝑉𝑣 (𝑡) =
0, hence 𝑣̃𝑖 (𝑡) = 0, 𝑣̃̇𝑖 (𝑡) = 0 [88]. Therefore, after 𝑡 > 𝑡𝑓 we can re-write (89) as

0  ai (t )   (t )   (t )  ai (t )

(94)
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where 𝜂 is called equivalent output error injection to maintain the sliding motion [88]. In
practice, 𝜂 can be extracted by passing the switching signal 𝐿𝑣 𝑠𝑔𝑛(𝑣̃𝑖 (𝑡)) through a lowpass filter with unity steady-state gain. Next, we analyze the error dynamics (90) using the
1

𝐾

Lyapunov function candidate 𝑉𝑎 (𝑡) = 2 𝑎̃𝑖2 (𝑡) + 2 𝜏̃ 2 (𝑡) where 𝐾 > 0. The derivative of
the Lyapunov function candidate can be written as:
.

Va (t )  ai (t )ai (t )  K (t ) (t )

(95)

After 𝑡 > 𝑡𝑓 we have 𝜂(𝑡) = 𝑎𝑖 (𝑡) and 𝑣̃𝑖 (𝑡) = 0. Hence, we can re-write (95) as
.
1
Va (t )   ai (t )ai 1 (t ) (t )  La ai (t )(ai (t ))  K (t ) (t )
h

(96)

Considering the fact 𝜏 is constant and hence 𝜏̇ = 0, we can re-write (96) as
.
1
Va (t )   ai (t )ai 1 (t ) (t )  La ai (t )(ai (t ))  K (t )ˆ(t )
h

(97)
1

Applying the update law (86) and choosing 𝐾 = 𝐿 , (97) becomes
𝑏

.

Va (t )   La ai2 (t )  0

(98)

This concludes the decaying behavior of 𝑉𝑎 (𝑡)that is 𝑉𝑎 (𝑡) ≤ 𝑉(0). So, starting
from any positive initial value of 𝑉𝑎 (0), 𝑉𝑎 (𝑡) → 𝛾 < ∞ is bounded as 𝑡 → ∞. Hence, by
1

𝐾

recalling 𝑉𝑎 (𝑡) = 2 𝑎̃𝑖2 (𝑡) + 2 𝜏̃ 2 (𝑡), we conclude that 𝑎̃𝑖 (𝑡) and 𝜏̃ (𝑡)are bounded as well.
Convergence of 𝑎̃𝑖 : In this part, we prove 𝑎̃𝑖 (𝑡) → 0 as 𝑡 → ∞. We derive the second
derivative of Lyapunov candidate 𝑉𝑎 (𝑡) with respect to time as
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Va (t )  2 La ai (t )ai (t )

(99)

After 𝑡 > 𝑡𝑓 , replacing 𝑎̃̇𝑖 (𝑡) by
1 .
ai (t )   a i 1 (t )  La ai (t )
h

(100)

we have
Va (t )  2

La
ai (t )ai 1 (t )  2 L2a ai2 (t )
h

(101)

As it mentioned earlier, 𝑎̃𝑖 (𝑡) and 𝜏̃

are bounded. Furthermore, referring to

Assumption 13, 𝑎̇ 𝑖−1 is bounded. Hence, (101)shows the boundedness of 𝑉𝑎̈ (𝑡) < ∞ which
equivalently verifies that 𝑉𝑎̇ (𝑡) is uniformly continuous. Now, applying Barbalat's lemma
[92] on 𝑉𝑎̇ (𝑡) combined with the fact that 𝑉𝑎 (𝑡) is bounded, we have 𝑉𝑎̇ (𝑡) → 0 as 𝑡 → ∞.
Consequently, 𝑉𝑎̇ (𝑡) = −2𝐿𝑎 𝑎̃𝑖2 (𝑡) → 0. indicates that 𝑎̃𝑖 (𝑡) → 0as 𝑡 → ∞.
Convergence of 𝝉̃
In this part, we prove 𝜏̃ → 0as 𝑡 → ∞. We know that





0

ai (t )dx  ai ()  ai (0)  ai (0)  

(102)

Furthermore, 𝑉𝑎̇ (𝑡), 𝑎̃𝑖 (𝑡) and 𝜏̃ are uniformly continuous. Also, referring to
Assumption 13, second derivative of 𝑎𝑖−1 (𝑡) exists and is finite which equivalently imply
that, 𝑎̇ 𝑖−1 (𝑡) is uniformly continuous. Hence, using (100) we conclude 𝑎̃̇𝑖 (𝑡)is uniformly
continuous. Therefore, by applying Barbalat's lemma [92], and considering the fact that
𝑎̃̇𝑖 (𝑡)is bounded, we can conclude 𝑎̃̇𝑖 (𝑡) → 0as 𝑡 → ∞. Next, considering (78), where
𝑎̃̇𝑖 (𝑡) → 0 and 𝑎̃𝑖 (𝑡) → 0 as 𝑡 → ∞, it is clear that 𝜏̃ → 0 as 𝑡 → ∞.
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Remark 12: The estimate of the delay parameter, 𝜏̂ , will be used to detect the
occurrence of the DoS attack. Ideally, a DoS occurrence will be detected when 𝜏̂ > 0.
Furthermore, the magnitude of 𝜏̂ will serve as an estimate of the effect of DoS.
The effects of uncertainties have not been considered in the design of the detection
observers. However, possible sources of uncertainty that affect the diagnostic scheme are:
1) unmodeled dynamics, 2) Radar measurement noise [93]-[94] 3) inherent communication
delay in a practical DSRC network, 4) Driver behavior which affects CACC gains e.g. 𝑘𝑝
and 𝑘𝑑 [95]. The presence of these uncertainties prohibits 𝜏̂ from having the idealized
property of being zero even in the absence of any DoS attack. One of the possible ways to
deal with this is to use nonzero threshold set based on a realistic DSRC network behavior.
The detection logic will be: DoS attack is detected when 𝜏̂ > 𝛿 and no DoS when 𝜏̂ ≤
𝛿where 𝛿 is the threshold. The effect of the uncertainties on 𝜏̂ will be suppressed below
this threshold value.
Below are the guidelines for selection of constant threshold values for the evaluation of the
residual:
Step 1: Collect 𝜏̂ data under no DoS attack in normal DSRC network conditions from
Monte-Carlo simulations or experimental studies.
Step 2: Plot the probability distribution of 𝜏̂ . An example probability distribution is
shown in Fig. 21.In practice, this probability distribution will depend on uncertainties in the
experimental data or of the Monte-Carlo study.
Step 3: Select a maximum allowable probability of false alarms.
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Step 4: It can be seen from Fig. 21 that the probability of the false alarms can be
computed by the following equation:


PFA   p0 ( x)dx,


(103)

where 𝑃𝐹𝐴 is the probability of DoS false alarm, 𝛿 is the selected threshold for DoS attack
and 𝑝0 (𝑥) is the 𝜏̂ probability distribution under no DoS attack in the DSRC network. The
goal here is to select 𝛿 which will yield an acceptable 𝑃𝐹𝐴 .

Figure 21. Residual probability distribution under no attack condition

6.2.3. Simulation Studies
In this section, we present simulation studies to evaluate the effectiveness of the
proposed scheme. In this simulation setup, we consider a platoon of four identical vehicles
equipped with CACC system. The vehicles in the platoon exchange their safety related
messages including acceleration information through DSRC network. Furthermore, we
assume that the platoon follows a dynamic velocity profile, namely the US06 driving cycle
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shown in Fig. 13. In simulation, we repeat this driving cycle 13 times to create velocity
trajectory followed by the leader vehicle. Model and control parameters of the platoon and
CACC system are chosen as ℎ = 0.3 𝑠, 𝑘𝑝 = 0.7, and 𝑘𝑑 = 1 [30]-[31]. To illustrate the
results of the proposed algorithm, we particularly focus on the performance of the Vehicle
3 in the platoon. Since we focus on Vehicle 3, the presented algorithm containing two
observers implemented in Vehicle 2, as noted in Remark 12. Next, we present the following
case studies.
Case 1: In this case study, we motivate the need for the DoS attack detection
algorithm by illustrating the adverse effects of the attacks on the platoon. In Fig. 22, we
show the relative distance (𝑑3 ), velocity (𝑣3 ) and acceleration (𝑎3 ) of Vehicle 3 in the
presence of the DoS attacks. To simulate the the effect of the DoS attacks, different
magnitudes of delays are injected to the DSRC network. In the ideal case when there is no
delay in DSRC network, i.e.𝜏 = 0 𝑠, the relative distance of Vehicle 3 is maintained above
the minimum safety distance 𝑑𝑠 for all time. However, the performance of Vehicle 3
degrades when we increase the magnitude of the DoS attacks, i.e. 𝜏 > 0.2 𝑠. In these
scenarios, the minimum distance requirement is violated as shown in the top plot in Fig.22.
These violations represent crash scenarios in a platoon of self-driving vehicles. From this
case study, we can conclude that DoS attack might lead to potentially dangerous situations.
Hence, the need for DoS detection is evident for secure control of connected vehicles.
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Figure 22: Performance of the Vehicle 3 in the platoon under DoS Attacks in DSRC
Network

Case 2: In the second case study, we consider a more realistic scenario in the
simulation. Ideal communication does not exist in practical applications, especially for
DSRC [23]. Hence, we add a random non-zero mean delay with Gaussian distribution to
the communication network. This random delay represents the inherent uncertainties in
DSRC communication. The mean value and standard deviation of the network induced
delay are chosen as 𝜇𝑁 = 0.1 𝑠 and 𝜎𝑁 = 0.03 𝑠, respectively. Next, we show the
performance of the scheme in presence of this inherent communication delay. Note that,
there is no DoS attack in this case study. The relative distance (𝑑3 ), velocity (𝑣3 ) and
acceleration (𝑎3 ) corresponding to Vehicle 3 are shown in Fig. 23 under this scenario. We
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can see in the top plot of Fig. 23 that the CACC performs reasonably as the inter-vehicle
distance between two cars is more than the assigned safety distance, 𝑑𝑠 = 0.5 𝑚. Regarding
the detection scheme, observers are initialized with incorrect values of 𝑎̂3 (0) = 0 and
𝜏̂ (0) = 0, respectively. The estimated value of acceleration in Vehicle 3 is shown in the first
plot of Fig. 24. As can be seen in Fig. 24, the estimated value (𝑎̂3 ) converges to its actual
value (𝑎3 ). The estimation error is given in the bottom plot in Fig. 24. Furthermore, the
detection algorithm is able to estimate the mean value of this network-induced delay as
shown in the first plot of Fig. 25. We quantify the estimation performance in terms of
convergence time. Referring to Fig. 25, the convergence time is within 100 seconds for the
delay estimation. Importantly, the estimated delay is within the predefined threshold (𝛿)
indicating no occurrence of DoS.

Figure 23: Performance of the Vehicle 3 in the platoon under normal DSRC Network
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Figure 24: Acceleration estimation in Vehicle 3. The variable 𝑎3 denotes actual value
and 𝜂 denotes estimated value.

Figure 25: Network induced delay and estimation of the delay in normal DSRC
Network
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Case 3: In this case, we test the effectiveness of the proposed approach under DoS
attack. To emulate the DoS attack, a delay of 𝜏 = 0.5 𝑠 is injected at 𝑡 = 3000 𝑠 to the
communication network apart from the a aforementioned network induced delay. The
induced delay takes certain time to reach a constant steady-state value as shown in Fig. 28.
This is due to the assumption that it takes certain time for the attacker to jam the network.
Fig. 26 shows the relative distance 𝑑3 , velocity 𝑣3 and acceleration 𝑎3 of Vehicle 3 in the
presence of this DoS attack. Observers are initialized with incorrect values of 𝑎̂3 (0) = 0
and 𝜏̂ (0) = 0, respectively. The estimated acceleration of vehicle 3, 𝑎̂3 is shown in the top
plot of Fig. 27 along with the actual value of 𝑎3 . The acceleration estimation error given by
bottom plot of Fig. 27. These two figures illustrate that the estimated value 𝑎̂3 (𝑡) converges
to the actual value in finite time. Furthermore, the algorithm is also able to detect and
estimate the DoS attack. The top plot in Fig. 28 shows the delay estimation performance.
The DoS estimation error is given in the bottom plot of Fig. 28. The attack is detected when
the estimated delay (𝜏̂ ) crossed the threshold (𝛿) after the attack occurrence. The estimate
𝜏̂ closely tracks the true delay 𝜏. The steady-state delay estimation error lies within less than
10% of the original value.
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Figure 26: Performance of the Vehicle 3 in the platoon under DoS attack in DSRC
network

Figure 27: Acceleration estimation in Vehicle 3. The variable 𝑎3 denotes actual value
and 𝜂 denotes estimated value.
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Figure 28: Delay estimation under DoS attack

Next, we illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach under several form of
uncertainties. In all these following scenarios, a non-zero mean Gaussian delay with the
mean value of 𝜇𝑁 = 0.1 𝑠 and standard deviation of 𝜎𝑁 = 0. 03 𝑠 is considered as the
network induced delay. Furthermore, a constant delay of 𝜏 = 0.5 𝑠 is added to represent the
attack at 𝑡 = 3000𝑠.

Case 4: In this case study we demonstrate the robustness of DoS detection algorithm
to the uncertainty in the proportional gain 𝑘𝑝 . Note that the observers are designed based on
the nominal parameter value whereas the actual vehicle parameter is different than the
nominal value. The nature of the uncertainty is an additive constant offset added to the
nominal value of parameter 𝑘𝑝 . We inject 5%, 10%, 15%, and 20% uncertainties to the 𝑘𝑝 ,
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i.e. 𝑘𝑝 = 𝑘𝑝0 + ∆𝑘𝑝 where 𝑘𝑝0 is the nominal value and ∆𝑘𝑝 is the injected uncertainty.
Figure.29 presents the estimated values of the delay under these uncertainties. As can be
seen from Fig. 29, the proposed scheme can detect the DoS attack in less than 70 seconds
after the attack injection even in the presence of uncertainties. However, delay estimation
suffers from these uncertainties leading to 15% or more error.

Figure 29: Delay estimation performance under different levels of uncertainties in the
parameter 𝑘𝑝 . The scenario is based on Case 4.

Case 5: In this scenario, the robustness of the proposed scheme is evaluated under
uncertain 𝑘𝑑 . To study the effect of uncertainties, we inject 5%, 10%, 15% , and 20%
uncertainties to the nominal value of 𝑘𝑑 in the model. Same as before, the observers are
designed based on the nominal parameter value. Figure. 30 shows the delay estimation for
different levels of uncertainties in 𝑘𝑑 . As can be inferred from Fig. 30, the DoS detection
algorithm can detect the DoS attack despite the uncertainties. However, the presence of
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uncertainties affects the accurate delay estimation. For example, there is 15% estimation
error under 20% uncertain 𝑘𝑑 .

Figure 30: Delay estimation performance under different levels of uncertainties in the
parameter𝑘𝑑 . The scenario is based on Case 5.

Case 6: In this case study the effects of measurement noise is discussed. A zero
mean Gaussian noise with standard deviation of 𝜎 is added to the velocity measurement.
To illustrate the robustness of the proposed scheme under measurement uncertainty in 𝑉𝑖 ,
different levels of noises as

𝜎 = 0.07, 0.1, 0.14, 0.21 are added to the velocity

measurement. Figure 31 shows the delay estimation for different levels of measurement
noises in 𝑉𝑖 . It can be seen in Fig. 31 that the DoS detection algorithm detects the DoS attack
in all cases. However, the presence of uncertainties affects the accurate delay estimation.
For example, there is 25% estimation error under 𝜎 = 0.21.

87

Figure 31: Delay estimation performance under different levels of uncertainties in
𝑉𝑖 measurement. The scenario is based on Case 6.
6.3. Strategy Number Three

In this section, we consider a distributed cyber physical system with a shared
communication network where the local controller of a sub-system receives measurements
with delay. The amount of lumped delay produced by sensor measurements and network
communication, is unknown. A new observer-based algorithm is proposed to estimate the
states of the system at the time 𝑡 when only delayed measurements are available. The main
contribution of this section of the thesis is the idea of using new observer-based algorithm
to estimate an unknown delay and states of a system in the presence of delayed
measurements. This study under the condition of unknown delay in the measurements has
not been explored in the existing literatures. To address this research gap, a new approach
consisting of two observers is presented. i) a PDE-based observer to estimate the unknown
delay with adaptive estimation ; and ii) an ODE-based observer to predict the states of the
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system using the information from the former observer. Theoretical contributions of this
section are devoted to mathematically proving the convergence of estimation error in both
ODE delayed observer as well as PDE observer.
Notation: In this section, the following notations are used:
𝑧𝑡 (𝑥, 𝑡) =

𝜕𝑧(𝑥,𝑡)
𝜕𝑡

, 𝑧𝑥 (𝑥, 𝑡) =

1

𝜕𝑧(𝑥,𝑡)
𝜕𝑥

, ‖𝑧(. )‖ = √∫0 𝑧 2 (𝑥, 𝑡)𝑑𝑥

6.3.1. Problem Statement
Consider a distributed cyber physical system with a shared communication network
shown in Fig.32. Each plant as a subsystem of the CPS transfers sensor measurements to
the local controller using the communication network.

Figure 32. A distributed CPS with a shared network.
For simplicity, we mainly focus on one subsystem of the CPS as it is depicted in
Fig.33. In this section, we consider a lumped constant unknown delay, 𝐷, between the actual
measureable data and the data the controller receives. The system dynamics can be modelled
as:
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𝑋̇(𝑡) = 𝐴𝑋(𝑡) + 𝐵𝑈(𝑡)

(104)

𝑌(𝑡) = 𝐶𝑋(𝑡 − 𝐷)

(105)

Figure 33. A schematic of a sub-plant of the distributed CPS.
Where ∈ ℝ𝑛 , 𝑌 ∈ ℝ𝑚 and 𝑈 ∈ ℝ𝑝 are states, output and input of the system
respectively. 𝐴: ℝ𝑛 × ℝ𝑛 , 𝐵: ℝ𝑛 × ℝ𝑝 , 𝐶: ℝ𝑚 × ℝ𝑛 are well defined matrices and all
eigenvalues of 𝐴 have negative real part. 𝐷 ∈ ℝ+ , 𝐷 ≤ 𝐷 ≤ 𝐷 is a nonzero lumped
unknown constant delay where the upper and lower bounds of the delay are known.
Dynamics of the delay is modelled with a transport PDE which allows a linear
parameterization in the unknown delay [98].
𝐷𝑧𝑡 (𝑥, 𝑡) = 𝑧𝑥 (𝑥, 𝑡)

, 𝑥 ∈ [0,1]

(106)

𝑧(0, 𝑡) = 𝐶𝑋(𝑡 − 𝐷)

(107)

𝑧(1, 𝑡) = 𝐶𝑋(𝑡)

(108)

NOTE: Measured value in the plant at time t is 𝐶𝑋(𝑡), but the available
measurement in the controller is 𝐶𝑋(𝑡 − 𝐷).
Where 𝑧(𝑥, 𝑡) is the state of communication network in the transport PDE model
and only 𝑧(0, 𝑡) is available as the measurement in the controller.
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𝑧(𝑥, 𝑡) = 𝐶𝑋(𝑡 + 𝐷(𝑥 − 1))

(109)

Therefore, we can write 𝑧(𝑥, 𝑡) as the solution of the PDE (106)-(108) and Ordinary
Differential Equation (ODE) system (1)-(2) as follows:
𝑡

𝑋(𝑡) = 𝑒 𝐴𝑡 𝑋0 + ∫𝑡 𝑒 𝐴(𝑡−𝜃) 𝐵𝑈(𝜃)𝑑𝜃
0

Where, 𝑋0 = 𝑋(𝑡 = 𝑡0 )
Considering (6), the solution of the PDE (3)-(5) is derived as:
𝑡

𝑧(𝑥, 𝑡) = 𝐶 [𝑒 𝐴𝐷(𝑥−1) 𝑋(𝑡) − ∫𝑡+𝐷(𝑥−1) 𝑒 𝐴(𝑡+𝐷(𝑥−1)−𝜃) 𝐵𝑈(𝜃)𝑑𝜃]

(110)

The goal of this section is to design a state estimation to predict (𝑡) , while only the
delayed measurements, 𝐶𝑋(𝑡 − 𝐷), is available.
6.3.2. Estimation Algorithm
In this section, we will discuss the proposed scheme in detail. As mentioned before,
the main objective of this scheme is to estimate the unknown delay, 𝐷, and predict the states
of the system 𝑋(𝑡). From the schematic depicted in Fig. 24, it can be inferred that the
algorithm consists of two observers working in cascade manner as follows.
Observer I: This observer is an adaptive observer based on the PDE dynamics of
the unknown delay. Using the available measurements affected by the delay, the observer
estimates the unknown delay and updates the adaptation law. The estimated delay is fed
into the Observer II to predict 𝑋(𝑡).
Observer II: The second observer is an ODE based linear observer which is
designed using the estimated delay and available system inputs and outputs.
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The details of the design of these individual elements are discussed in the
subsequent sections.
Remark 14: The presented scheme is designed and implemented in the local
controller. Hence, observers only use available information in the controller.

Figure 34. The schematic of the proposed algorithm.
Observer I
We consider the observer dynamics as the following [96]-[97]
̂ (𝑌(𝑡) − 𝑌̂(𝑡))
𝑋̂̇(𝑡) = 𝐴𝑋̂(𝑡) + 𝐵𝑈(𝑡) + 𝐿1 𝐷

(111)

̂)
𝑌̂(𝑡) = 𝐶𝑋̂(𝑡 − 𝐷

(112)

̂ (𝑡) is the estimated value of unknown delay, 𝑋̂ (𝑡) and 𝑌̂(𝑡) are the
Where, 𝐷
estimations of 𝑋(𝑡) and 𝑌(𝑡) respectively. Similar to the original system, in the observer
design, the estimated delay is modelled with a transport PDE:
̂)
𝑧̂ (0, 𝑡) = 𝑌̂(𝑡) = 𝐶𝑋̂(𝑡 − 𝐷

(113)
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𝑧̂ (1, 𝑡) = 𝐶𝑋̂(𝑡)

(114)

where
̂ (𝑥 − 1)) = 𝐶 [𝑋̂𝑒 𝐴𝐷̂(𝑥−1) 𝑋̂(𝑡) − ∫
𝑧̂ (𝑥, 𝑡) = 𝐶𝑋̂ (𝑡 + 𝐷

𝑡

𝑒 𝐴(𝑡+𝐷̂(𝑥−1)−𝜃) 𝐵𝑈(𝜃)𝑑𝜃]

̂ (𝑥−1)
𝑡+𝐷

(115)
Using (12), dynamic of the estimated delay is given as
̂ 𝑧̂𝑡 (𝑥, 𝑡) = 𝑧̂𝑥 (𝑥, 𝑡) (1 + 𝐷
̂̇ (𝑥 − 1)) + 𝐷
̂ 𝐿1 𝑧̃ (0, 𝑡)
𝐷

(116)

Next, we implement (116) in (111)-(112) to re-write the observer dynamics
𝑋̂̇(𝑡) = 𝐴𝑋̂(𝑡) + 𝐵𝑈(𝑡) + 𝐿1 (𝑧̃ (0, 𝑡))

(117)

̂ 𝑧̂𝑡 (𝑥, 𝑡) = 𝑧̂𝑥 (𝑥, 𝑡) (1 + 𝐷
̂̇ (𝑥 − 1)) + 𝐷
̂ 𝐿1 𝑧̃ (0, 𝑡)
𝐷

(118)

̂ ) , 𝑧̂ (1, 𝑡) = 𝐶𝑋̂(𝑡)
𝑧̂ (0, 𝑡) = 𝑌̂(𝑡) = 𝐶𝑋̂(𝑡 − 𝐷

(119)

̃ =𝐷−𝐷
̂ as the delay estimation
where, 𝑧̃ (𝑥, 𝑡) = 𝑧(𝑥, 𝑡) − 𝑧̂ (𝑥, 𝑡). Defining 𝐷
̂ in the left side of (118) can be substituted by 𝐷
̂ =𝐷−𝐷
̃ . Further, (118) as the
error, 𝐷
observer dynamic can be re-written as
̃ 𝑧̂𝑡 (𝑥, 𝑡) + 𝑧̂𝑥 (𝑥, 𝑡) (1 + 𝐷
̂̇ (𝑥 − 1)) + 𝐷
̂ 𝐿1 𝑧̃ (0, 𝑡)
𝐷𝑧̂𝑡 (𝑥, 𝑡) = 𝐷

(120)

The standard projector operator is given by
̂ = 𝐷 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜏 < 0
0, 𝐷
̇
̂ = 𝛾𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗 {𝜏(𝑡)} = { 0, 𝐷
𝐷
̂ = 𝐷 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜏 > 0
𝜏(𝑡) ,
𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒
Where 𝜏(𝑡) based on Lyapunov analysis in Theorem 1, is designed as
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(121)

1

𝜏(𝑡) = − 𝐷̂ 𝑧̃ (0, 𝑡)𝑧̂𝑥 (0, 𝑡)

(122)

And 𝛾 > 0 is the adaptation gain which can be selected as a small enough value.
The estimation error dynamics are derived by subtracting (120) from (106),
𝑋̃̇(𝑡) = 𝐴𝑋̃(𝑡) − 𝐿1 𝑧̃ (0, 𝑡)
̃
𝐷

𝐷𝑧̃𝑡 (𝑥, 𝑡) = 𝑧̃𝑥 (𝑥, 𝑡) − 𝐷̂ 𝑧̂𝑥 (𝑥, 𝑡) −

(123)
̂̇
𝐷𝐷
(𝑥
̂
𝐷

− 1)𝑧̂𝑥 (𝑥, 𝑡) − 𝐿1 𝐷𝑧̃ (0, 𝑡)

(124)

𝑧̃ (1, 𝑡) = 𝐶𝑋̃(𝑡)
̃̇ (𝑡) = −𝐷
̂̇ (𝑡)
𝐷

(125)

Theorem 1: Consider a system described with (104)-(106) and unknown delay
dynamics as (107)-(108). For the observer designed as (111)-(114) and adaptive delay
̃ , will
estimator of (121), the output estimation error 𝑧̃ (0, 𝑡) and delay estimation error, 𝐷
converge to a bounded area as 𝑡 → ∞, if the observer gain 𝐿1 is selected large enough to
satisfy the following condition,
𝐿1 >

|𝑧̃𝑥 (0, 𝑡)|
𝐷|𝑧̃ (0, 𝑡)|

Proof: To analyse the estimation error dynamics, we consider function (126) as
Lyapunov candidate
̃2
𝑊(𝑡) = 𝑎1 𝐷𝑧̃ (0, 𝑡)2 + 𝑎2 𝐷

(126)

Where, 𝑎1 > 0 , 𝑎2 > 0 and 𝐷 > 0, derivate of 𝑊(𝑡) with respect to time is given
as
𝜕
̃𝐷
̂̇
𝑊̇ (𝑡) = 𝑎1 𝐷 𝜕𝑡 (𝑧̃ (0, 𝑡)2 ) − 2𝑎2 𝐷

(127)
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Therefore,
̃𝐷
̂̇
𝑊̇ (𝑡) = 2𝑎1 𝐷𝑧̃ (0, 𝑡)𝑧̃𝑡 (0, 𝑡) − 2𝑎2 𝐷

(128)

Substituting 𝑧̃𝑡 (0, 𝑡) from (124) at 𝑥 = 0

𝑊̇ (𝑡) = 2𝑎1 𝑧̃ (0, 𝑡) (𝑧̃𝑥 (0, 𝑡) −

̃
̂̇
𝐷
𝐷𝐷
̃𝐷
̂̇
𝑧̂𝑥 (0, 𝑡) +
𝑧̂𝑥 (0, 𝑡) − 𝐷𝐿1 𝑧̃ (0, 𝑡)) − 2𝑎2 𝐷
̂
̂
𝐷
𝐷
(129)

̂̇ as given by (121)-(122), simplifies (129) to the following
The updating rule of 𝐷
equation
̃ (𝑎1
𝑊̇ (𝑡) = 2𝑎1 𝑧̃ (0, 𝑡)𝑧̃𝑥 (0, 𝑡) − 2𝐷

̂̇
𝑧̂𝑥 (0, 𝑡)
𝐷𝐷
̂̇ ) + 2𝑎1 𝑧̃ (0, 𝑡)
𝑧̃ (0, 𝑡) − 𝑎2 𝐷
𝑧̂ (0, 𝑡)
̂
̂ 𝑥
𝐷
𝐷

− 2𝑎1 𝐷𝐿1 𝑧̃ (0, 𝑡)2
(130)
Choosing 𝑎2 = 𝑎1 and substituting the expressions of (122), we get
𝐷
𝑊̇ (𝑡) = 2𝑎1 𝑧̃ (0, 𝑡)𝑧̃𝑥 (0, 𝑡) − 2𝑎1 𝐷̂2 𝑧̃ (0, 𝑡)2 𝑧̂𝑥 (0, 𝑡)2 − 2 𝑎1 𝐷𝐿𝑧̃ (0, 𝑡)2

(131)

𝐷
𝑊̇ (𝑡) ≤ 2𝑎1 (|𝑧̃ (0, 𝑡)||𝑧̃𝑥 (0, 𝑡)|) − 2𝑎1 𝐷̂ 𝑧̃ (0, 𝑡)2 𝑧̂𝑥 (0, 𝑡)2 − 2 𝑎1 𝐷𝐿1 |𝑧̃ (0, 𝑡)|2 (132)
𝐷
𝑊̇ (𝑡) ≤ 2𝑎1 |𝑧̃ (0, 𝑡)|(|𝑧̃𝑥 (0, 𝑡)| − 𝐷𝐿1 |𝑧̃ (0, 𝑡)|) − 2𝑎1 𝐷̂ 𝑧̃ (0, 𝑡)2 𝑧̂𝑥 (0, 𝑡)2

(133)

As long as we can choose observer gain 𝐿1 to satisfy the following condition,
𝐿1 >

|𝑧̃𝑥 (0, 𝑡)|
𝐷|𝑧̃ (0, 𝑡)|
(134)
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Therefore, we can conclude the negative semi deﬁniteness of 𝑊̇ (𝑡). Hence,
𝑊̇ (𝑡) will settle on or within a bounded ball of radius 𝑅𝑜𝐶 as 𝑡 → ∞. Note that the
magnitude of 𝑅𝑜𝐶 can be made arbitrarily small by choosing a high value of 𝐿1 .
𝑅𝑜𝐶:

|𝑧̃𝑥 (0, 𝑡)|
− 𝐿1 < 0
𝐷|𝑧̃ (0, 𝑡)|

Observer II
Observer II utilizes the estimated delay obtained from Observe I to predict states of
the system at time 𝑡; while, only the delayed measurements at 𝑡 − 𝐷 are available.
Assumption 15: The signal 𝑋(𝑡) is at least once differentiable with respect to time.
Furthermore, the derivative is bounded by some finite value, i.e. |𝑋̇(𝑡)| < 𝑋𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑥 , ∀ 𝑡 >
0.
Considering the system dynamics (104)-(105), we design the second observer as
follows
𝑋̂̇(𝑡) = 𝐴𝑋̂(𝑡) + 𝐵𝑈(𝑡) + 𝐿2 (𝑌(𝑡) − 𝑌̂(𝑡))
̂)
𝑌̂(𝑡) = 𝐶𝑋̂(𝑡 − 𝐷

(135)

̂ (𝑡) ∈ [𝐷 , 𝐷] is the estimated delay derived from the Observer I.
Where 𝐷
̂ (𝑡) has a bounded derivative with respect to time.
Remark 15: Referring to (121), 𝐷
Substituting the (135) in the dynamic of Observer II is given as,
̂ (𝑡)))
𝑋̂̇(𝑡) = 𝐴𝑋̂(𝑡) + 𝐵𝑈(𝑡) + 𝐿2 (𝑌(𝑡) − C𝑋̂(𝑡 − 𝐷

(136)

Next, by subtracting (136) from first equation of (134), the estimation error
dynamic is derived as
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̂ (𝑡))) + 𝑀(𝑡)
𝑋̃̇(𝑡) = 𝐴𝑋̃(𝑡) − 𝐿2 𝐶 (𝑋̃(𝑡 − 𝐷

(137)

where, 𝐿2 is the second observer’s gain and 𝑀(𝑡) is the bounded uncertainty due the delay
estimation error.
With initial condition as 𝑋̃(𝑡0 ) = 𝑋̃0 , 𝑋̃(𝑠) = 0, 𝑠 < 𝑡0 , we will apply the following
Lyapunov-Krasovskii functional for delay-dependent analysis of (137)
𝑉(𝑡, 𝑋̃, 𝑋̃̇) = 𝑋̃ 𝑇 (𝑡)𝑃𝑋̃(𝑡) + ∫

𝑡

𝑒 𝑎(𝑠−𝑡) 𝑋̃ 𝑇 (𝑠)𝑆𝑋̃(𝑠)𝑑𝑠

𝑡−D
𝑡

𝑒 𝑎(𝑠−𝑡) 𝑋̃ 𝑇 (𝑠)𝐸𝑋̃(𝑠)𝑑𝑠

∫
𝑡−𝐷
0

𝑡

+D ∫ ∫ 𝑒 𝑎(𝑠−𝑡) 𝑋̃̇ 𝑇 (𝑠)𝑅𝑋̃̇(𝑠)𝑑𝑠 𝑑𝜃
−D

𝑡+𝜃

(138)
where 𝑎 > 0, 𝑏 > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑛 × 𝑛 − 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝑃 > 0, 𝑆 > 0, 𝐸 > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅 > 0
Preposition 1: The error dynamics represented in (34) is stable and converges to
a bounded region exponentially, if there exist 𝐿2 > 0 and 𝑎 > 0, 𝑏 > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑛 × 𝑛 −
𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝑃 > 0, 𝑆 > 0, 𝐸 > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅 > 0 matrix such that along trajectories of (137), the
Lyapunov-Krasovskii function (138) satisfies the following condition [99]-[100].
𝑊2 =∆𝑎𝑉 − 𝑏|𝑀|2 + 𝑉̇ < 0

(139)

Then, the solution of (124) with initial condition of 𝑋̃(𝑡0 ) = 𝑋̃0 satisfies the
inequality
2
𝑏
𝑋̃ 𝑇 (𝑡)𝑃𝑋̃(𝑡) < 𝑒 −𝑎(𝑡−𝑡0 ) 𝑋̃0𝑇 𝑃𝑋̃0 + [1 − 𝑒 −𝑎(𝑡−𝑡0 ) ] 𝑎 |𝑀[𝑡0 ,𝑡∞] |

∞
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(140)

Proof: Applying comparison principle [99], we have
𝑡

𝑋̃ 𝑇 (𝑡)𝑃𝑋̃(𝑡) ≤ 𝑉(𝑡, 𝑥̃𝑡 , 𝑥̃𝑡̇ ) < 𝑒 −𝑎(𝑡−𝑡0 ) 𝑉(𝑡, 𝑥̃𝑡0 , 𝑥̃𝑡0̇ ) + ∫ 𝑒 −𝑎(𝑡−𝑠) 𝑏|𝑀(𝑠)|2 𝑑𝑠
𝑡0

(141)
Lyapunov candidate 𝑉 can be written as (142) as a positive definite function
𝑉 (𝑡, 𝑋̃, 𝑋̃̇) = 𝑉1 + 𝑉2 + 𝑉3 + 𝑉4

(142)

where
𝑉1 = 𝑋̃ 𝑇 (𝑡)𝑃𝑋̃(𝑡)
𝑡

𝑉2 = ∫

𝑡−D
𝑡

𝑉3 = ∫

𝑡−D

(143)

𝑒 𝑎(𝑠−𝑡) 𝑋̃ 𝑇 (𝑠)𝑆𝑋̃(𝑠)𝑑𝑠

(144)

𝑒 𝑎(𝑠−𝑡) 𝑋̃ 𝑇 (𝑠)𝐸𝑋̃(𝑠)𝑑𝑠

(145)

0

𝑡

𝑉4 = D ∫ ∫ 𝑒 𝑎(𝑠−𝑡) 𝑋̃̇ 𝑇 (𝑠)𝑅𝑋̃̇(𝑠)𝑑𝑠 𝑑𝜃
−D

(146)

𝑡+𝜃

Making derivative of 𝑉 with respect to time,
𝑉1̇ = 2𝑋̃ 𝑇 (𝑡)𝑃𝑋̃̇(𝑡)

(147)
𝑉̇2 =

𝜕 −𝑎𝑡 𝑡 𝑎𝑠 𝑇
[𝑒
∫ 𝑒 𝑋̃ (𝑠)𝑆𝑋̃(𝑠)𝑑𝑠]
𝜕𝑡
𝑡−D

𝑡

= −𝑎𝑒 −𝑎𝑡 (∫

𝑒 𝑎𝑠 𝑋 𝑇 (𝑠)𝑆𝑋̃(𝑠)𝑑𝑠) + 𝑋̃ 𝑇 (𝑡)𝑆𝑋̃(𝑡)

𝑡−D

+ 𝑒 −𝐷𝑡 𝑋̃ 𝑇 (𝑡 − 𝐷)𝑆𝑋̃(𝑡 − 𝐷)
(148)
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Similarly,
𝑡

𝑉̇3 = −𝑎𝑒 −𝑎𝑡 (∫ 𝑒 𝑎𝑠 𝑋̃ 𝑇 (𝑠)𝐸𝑋̃(𝑠)𝑑𝑠) + 𝑋̃ 𝑇 (𝑡)𝐸𝑋̃(𝑡) + 𝑒 −𝐷𝑡 𝑋̃ 𝑇 (𝑡 − 𝐷)𝐸𝑋̃(𝑡 − 𝐷)
𝑡−D

(149)
0

𝑡

2
𝑉4̇ = −𝑎𝐷 (∫ ∫ 𝑒 𝑎(𝑠−𝑡) 𝑋̃̇ 𝑇 (𝑠)𝑅𝑋̃̇(𝑠)𝑑𝑠 𝑑𝜃) + 𝐷 𝑋̃̇ 𝑇 (𝑡)𝑅𝑋̃̇(𝑡)
−D

𝑡+𝜃
𝑡

− 𝐷 ∫ 𝑒 −𝑎(𝑠−𝑡) 𝑋̃̇ 𝑇 (𝑠)𝑅𝑋̃̇(𝑠)𝑑𝑠
𝑡−D

(150)
Substituting (142)-(146) and (147)-(150) in (139), we find
𝑊2 ≤ 2𝑋̃ 𝑇 (𝑡)𝑃𝑋̃̇(𝑡) + 𝑎𝑋̃ 𝑇 (𝑡)𝑃𝑋̃(𝑡) − 𝑏𝑀𝑇 (𝑡)𝑀(𝑡)
2

+ 𝐷 𝑋̃̇ 𝑇 (𝑡)𝑅𝑋̃̇(𝑡) − 𝐷𝑒 −𝑎𝐷 ∫

𝑡

𝑋̃̇ 𝑇 (𝑠)𝑅𝑋̃̇(𝑠)𝑑𝑠 + 𝑋̃ 𝑇 (𝑡)𝑆𝑋̃(𝑡) + 𝑋̃ 𝑇 (𝑡)[𝑆

𝑡−𝐷

+ 𝐸]𝑋̃(𝑡) − 𝑋̃ 𝑇 (𝑡 − 𝐷)𝑆𝑋̃(𝑡 − 𝐷) + [𝑋̃ 𝑇 (𝑡 − 𝐷)𝐸(𝑋̃(𝑡 − 𝐷)]𝑒 −𝑎𝐷
(151)
Next, applying the standard arguments we obtain that
𝑊2 ≤ 𝜂𝑇 (𝑡)Φη(𝑡) < 0

∀η(𝑡) ≠ 0

(152)

where, η(𝑡) = 𝑐𝑜𝑙 {𝑋̃(𝑡), 𝑋̃̇(𝑡), 𝑋̃(𝑡 − 𝐷), 𝑋̃(𝑡 − 𝐷), 𝑀(𝑡)} if the matrix inequality
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𝛷=

𝜙11
∗

𝜙12
𝜙22

0
0

−𝑃2𝑇 𝐿2 𝐶 + Re−𝑎𝐷
−𝑃3𝑇 𝐿2 𝐶

𝑃2𝑇
𝑃3𝑇

∗

∗

−(𝑆 + 𝑅)𝑒 −𝑎𝐷

𝑅𝑒 −𝑎𝐷

0

∗
[ ∗

∗
∗

∗
∗

−(2𝑅 + 𝐸)𝑒 −𝑎𝐷
∗

0
−𝑏𝐼 ]

<0

(153)

is feasible, where
𝜙11 = 𝐴𝑇 𝑃2 + 𝑃2𝑇 + 𝑎𝑃 + 𝑆 + 𝐸 − Re−𝑎𝐷

(154)

𝜙12 = 𝑃 − 𝑃2𝑇 + 𝐴𝑇 𝑃3

(155)

2

𝜙22 = −𝑃3 − 𝑃3𝑇 + 𝐷 𝑅

(156)

Thus, the following results will be obtained
Lemma 1: Given 𝑎 > 0, 𝑏 > 0 , 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐷 > 0 , let there exist 𝑛 × 𝑛 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝑃 >
0, 𝑃2 , 𝑃3 , 𝑆 > 0, 𝐸 > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅 > 0 such that the LMI (153) with notation given in (154)(156) holds. Then, the solution of (137) satisfies (140) for all delays 𝐷 ≤ 𝐷 ≤ 𝐷.
Moreover, the ellipsoid
𝜒∞ = {𝑋̃ ∈ 𝑅 𝑛 : 𝑋 𝑇 (𝑡)𝑃𝑋̃(𝑡) <

𝑏
𝑎

𝐾 2 . ∆2 }

(157)

is exponentially attractive with the decay rate 𝑎⁄2 for all |𝑀(𝑡)|2 ≤ 𝐾 2 . ∆2. ∎

6.3.3. Simulation Results and Discussion
To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme, we conducted simulation
study on a general system with the following dynamics.
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𝑋̇
1
−0.5 0 𝑋1
[ 1] = [
][ ]+ [ ]𝑈
0
6
−5 𝑋2
𝑋2̇
1
𝑌=[
0

(158)

0 𝑋1
][ ]
1 𝑋2

(159)

Where, 𝑈 is the system input as
𝜋

𝑈 = 3sin( 2 𝑡)

(160)

To illustrate the impact of the delay in the system, we simulate the system in two
cases of no delay and 0.9 𝑠𝑒𝑐 delay in the measurements in Fig. 35. The outputs of the
system with no delay are plotted in solid blue lines; while, the outputs of the system with
delay are shown with red dashed lines.

Figure 35. System performance in presence of delay
To estimate the delay and states of the system in the presence of the injected delay, two
observers are designed based on the proposed algorithm.
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Observer I
A constant delay of 𝐷 = 0.9 𝑠𝑒𝑐 is injected to system output measurements in
(159), therefore, available measurements are as follows:
1
𝑌=[
0

0 𝑋1 (𝑡 − 𝐷)
][
]
1 𝑋2 (𝑡 − 𝐷)

(161)

We model the delay with a transport PDE model where the boundary conditions of
the PDE are related to the system dynamics. To design the observer we assume the known
boundaries of delay as 𝐷 ∈ [𝐷, 𝐷] = [0.1, 1.5]. The gain 𝐿1 is designed as 𝐿1 =
[

𝐿11
𝐿21

𝐿12
] , therefore, referring to (20) the error dynamics is
𝐿22

𝑋̃̇
𝐿
−0.5 0 𝑋̃1
[ 1] = [
] [ ] − [ 11
𝐿21
6
−5 𝑋̃2
𝑋̃2̇

𝐿12 𝑢̃1 (0, 𝑡)
][
]
𝐿22 𝑢̃2 (0, 𝑡)

(162)

̂ = 0.5 𝑠 for the
Choosing 𝐿1 large enough to satisfy (134), and initial guess of 𝐷
̂ ) = 𝑧̂ (0, 𝑡) are provided in
delay, the observer estimates on delay and outputs 𝐶𝑋̂(𝑡 − 𝐷
Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 respectively. To verify the convergence of Observer I, initial condition
for states are 𝑧̂1 (0,0) = 13, 𝑧̂2 (0,0) = 16.5. Furthermore, we will quantify the
convergence performance of the estimates in terms of convergence time deﬁned as the time
taken to reach within ±2% band of the true value starting from the incorrect initial
condition. The delay estimation in Fig. 36 and delay estimation error in Fig. 37 prove that
the estimated value of delay converges to the exact value of 0.9 after 15 𝑠.
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Figure 36. Estimated delay.

Figure 37. Delay estimation error
̂ ).
Observe I also estimates the available outputs of the system, 𝑧̂ (0, 𝑡) = 𝐶𝑋̂(𝑡 − 𝐷
Fig. 38, shows the estimates of the outputs considering the on-line estimated value of delay.
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The actual outputs of the system which is can be measured in the controller are drawn with
solid blue lines and the estimated values are shown with red dashed lines.

Figure 38. Measured and estimated output.
Fig. 39 shows the estimation error, 𝑧̃ (0, 𝑡) = [𝑧̃1 (0, 𝑡)

𝑧̃2 (0, 𝑡)]𝑇 , for our case

study. The estimation error converges to a small bounded area of ±2% band of the true
value after 5 seconds. Along with output estimation from Observer I, Fig.40 depicts the
original

𝑧(𝑥, 𝑡) = [𝑧1 (𝑥, 𝑡)

𝑧2 (𝑥, 𝑡)]𝑇

and

[𝑧̂1 (𝑥, 𝑡) 𝑧̂2 (𝑥, 𝑡)]𝑇 .
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estimated

signals

𝑧̂ (𝑥, 𝑡) =

Figure 39. Estimation error

Figure 40. Original and estimated values of 𝑧(𝑥, 𝑡) = [𝑧1 (𝑥, 𝑡) 𝑧2 (𝑥, 𝑡)]𝑇
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Observer II
Considering the estimated delay, obtained from Observer I, the predicted states of
the system are derived via the second observer. To design the second observer, the
parameters 𝑎 > 0, 𝑏 > 0 are chosen as:
𝑎 = 1 ,𝑏 = 2
These values are selected such that the LMI in (153) is satisfied and matrix Φ is
negative definite. Solving the LMI the following positive definite matrixes are obtained.
𝐿2 = [

0.2 0.15
]
0.25 0.2

25.25 −19.66
𝑃1 = [
]
−19.66 15.30
𝑃2 = [

25.98 −19.75
]
−19.75 15.25

3.78
4.80
𝑃3 = [
]
4.80 6.2525
42.5256
𝑆=[
−32.811
4.0867
𝑅=[
5
𝐸=[

−32.811
]
25.3183
5
]
6.3

21.45 −16.55
]
−16.55 12.77

Therefore, the states of the system at time 𝑡 can be predicted as it is shown in Fig.
41. Both states are initialized with incorrect values to test the convergence properties of the
observer. The solid blue lines are the real states of the system before being transmitted
through the network communication and the red dashed lines represent the predicted states
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via the proposed algorithm. As it can be demonstrated from the results, after 10 seconds,
the predicted values converge to actual values of the states with a bounded error. The
estimation error for both states are given in Fig. 42.

Figure 41. Predicted states of the system at time 𝑡.

Figure 42. Prediction errors of Observer II
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CHAPTER SEVEN
RESILIENT STRATEGY TOWARD FALSE DATA INJECTION ATTACK
The contribution and novelty of this chapter is three fold. First, we develop a
continuous model of connected vehicles equipped with CACC algorithm using the PDE
approximation inspired by the extensive literature on traffic dynamics [7], [13]; The PDE
model simplifies the analysis regarding to system behavior and attack detection.
Furthermore, stability analysis regarding to delay and perturbation proportion is further easy
for PDE modeling comparing to ODE model of connected vehicles. The results of this
chapter are obtained by analyzing the PDE; they are then validated by simulation of a
dynamic equations of a platoon of 15 vehicles.
Second, we model an intelligent false data injection attack in the DSRC with fake
vehicle identities. The fake (ghost) vehicles in the platoon disrupt the smooth vehicle
density by corrupting desire the inter-vehicle distances. The ghost vehicles following the
same dynamics of CACC strategy. Hence, the false data injected attack studied in this
chpater, is not possible to detect with current attack detection methods developed based on
sensor faults detection methodologies.
Third, we propose a novel diagnosis scheme using active control concept to detect
false data injection attack in the vehicle platooning system. The proposed diagnosis
algorithm consist of a series of PDE observers to provide information of the location
of the injected ghost vehicles in the platoon. The most significant advantage of using a
PDE based analysis is that the PDE reveals perturbations, better than the discrete equations
do. The proposed scheme is capable of (1) detecting the occurrence of false data injection;
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and (2) determining the position of fake data injected into the platoon as fake (ghost)
vehicles. It is worth mentioning that we don’t apply the centralized controller to connected
vehicle. Indeed, each individual vehicle has its own decentralized CACC strategy with
works as its ODE version. However, we develop just one centralized observer into the
leader vehicle to identify the false data injection attack.
7.1. PDE Modeling of the Platoon (Combine with attack)
The notation in this section is a little different from the rest of the thesis. Therefore,
we redefine parameters of the platoon as follows.
Consider a homogeneous platoon of connected vehicles equipped with CACC
strategy. The vehicles follow their leader in a single lane (see Fig.43). Each vehicle in the
platoon is equipped with on-board sensors to measure the relative distance and velocity with
respect to its preceding. In addition, each vehicle receives the acceleration information of
the preceding vehicle through Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC) network
[30].
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Figure 43 : A platoon of CACC.
Remark 16: In this study, the leader vehicle follows a constant velocity profile with
a perturbation for diagnosis purposes. Hence, the velocity profiles of the vehicles in the
platoon are not constant.
Dynamics of vehicle 𝑖 in the platoon is given by [105]:

 Di  Vi 1  Vi 
 
 , i  Sm \{1}
 Vi   U i 

(163)

Where 𝑆𝑚 = {𝑖 ∈ 𝑁|1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚} is the set of all vehicles in the platoon of length of 𝑚,
𝐷𝑖 = 𝑞𝑖−1 − 𝑞𝑖 + 𝐿𝑖 + 𝑑𝑠 is the distance between vehicle 𝑖 and 𝑖 − 1, 𝑞𝑖 and 𝑞𝑖−1 are the
rear bumper position of vehicles 𝑖 and 𝑖 − 1. The length of vehicle 𝑖 is presented by 𝐿𝑖 , 𝑑𝑠
is the minimum safety distance between two vehicles, 𝑉𝑖 denotes the velocity of vehicle 𝑖.
Moreover, 𝑈𝑖 is the desired acceleration and acts as the vehicle control input [30].
The control strategy regarding to the inter-vehicle spacing obtains as follows
𝐷𝑟,𝑖 (𝑡) = ℎ𝑉𝑖 (𝑡), 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑚 \{1}

(164)

where 𝐷𝑟,𝑖 (𝑡) is the desire relative distance between vehicles 𝑖 and 𝑖 − 1 and ℎ is the time
headway. Without losing the generality, to simplify the analysis, we consider 𝑑𝑠 = 0 and
𝐿𝑖 = 0. The main objective of platooning is to regulate the 𝐷𝑖 to 𝐷𝑟,𝑖 , i.e.
𝐸𝑖 (𝑡) = 𝐷𝑖 (𝑡) − 𝐷𝑟,𝑖 (𝑡) → 0 as

𝑡→∞

(165)

Substituting (164) and 𝐷𝑖 = 𝑞𝑖−1 − 𝑞𝑖 in (165), the error is re-written as:

Ei  t   qi 1  t   qi  t   hVi  t 

(166)
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The vehicle control input of each vehicle in the platoon (𝑈𝑖 ) except the leader one
depends on the preceding vehicle control input (𝑈𝑖−1 ). Hence, this architecture employ a
decentralized control scheme. Next, we consider the following dynamic controller to
achieve the zero regulation error:
1
1
1
U i   U i  ( K P Ei  K D Ei )  U i 1
h
h
h

(167)

where 𝑈𝑖−1 and 𝑉𝑖−1 are the desired acceleration and velocity of the preceding vehicle
received through DSRC network. The parameters 𝐾𝑃 , 𝐾𝐷 >0 are controller gains designed
such that (i) the inter-vehicle distance is maintained to 𝐷𝑟,𝑖 and, (ii) 𝑈𝑖 changes smoothly
and remains bounded.
Remark 17: Referring to (167), the control signal of vehicle 𝑖 (𝑈𝑖 ) which is obtained
from CACC algorithm, depends on (1) states of vehicle i (𝐷𝑖 , 𝑉𝑖 , and 𝑈𝑖 ), and (2) the
transmitted information from the preceding vehicle (𝑈𝑖−1 ).
Next, we make the following assumptions:
Assumption 16: We consider a homogeneous platoon of vehicles. Therefore, all
vehicles in the platoon are identical and have the same parameters e.g. mass, inertia, rolling
resistance coefficient.
Assumption 17: Each vehicle in the platoon measures relative distance with respect
to preceding vehicle 𝐷𝑖 .
Remark 18: Vehicle 𝑖 measures the relative velocity via radar and hence can compute the
absolute velocity 𝑉𝑖−1 of vehicle 𝑖 − 1. Vehicle 𝑖 also receives acceleration 𝑈𝑖−1
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information of vehicle 𝑖 − 1 via DSRC network. Both these measurements are subjected
to measurement noises and uncertainties.
The leader vehicle in the platoon follows a fixed constant velocity trajectory. Hence,
the desired velocity and relative distance between vehicles are 𝑉𝑑 and 𝐷𝑠,𝑟 = ℎ𝑉𝑑 = ∆
respectively. By imposing constant velocity trajectories, the position of each vehicle in the
platoon is obtained as 𝑞1 (𝑡) = 𝑉𝑑 𝑡 and 𝑞𝑚 (𝑡) = 𝑉𝑑 𝑡 − (𝑚 − 1)𝛿. Therefore, each vehicle
trys to regulate its relative distance from its preceding vehicle to ∆ using CACC strategy.
Next, we develop a new coordinate as "Normalized Coordinate" to facilitate the
analysis [103],

qi (t )  Vd t  L
L
V (t )  Vd
vi  i
L
U  U d Ui
ui  i

L
L
yi 

where 𝐿 = 𝑚 × ∆ denotes the platoon length. Fig. 44(b) presents the schematic of the
platoon in the new coordinates. In the normal coordinate we get, 𝑦𝑖 (𝑡) ∈ [0,1], 𝑦1 (𝑡) ≡ 1,
and 𝑦𝑚 (𝑡) ≡ 0, where 𝑦1 (𝑡) and 𝑦𝑚 (𝑡) refer to leader's and last vehicle's positions
respectively. Here, we have implicitly assumed that the deviations of the vehicle positions
and velocities from their desired values are small.
The dynamics of the vehicle i in the normalized coordinate are given by

yi  ui

(168)

yi  vi

(169)
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Figure 44: Platoon with vehicles moving in a single lane (a) A platoon with leader and
follower vehicles. (b) Same platoon in 𝑦 coordinates.
where 𝑢𝑖 =



𝑈𝑖
𝐿

. The desired spacing and velocities are

V  Vd

, vd  d
 0, ud  0
L
L

(170)

and the desired position of the vehicle 𝑖 is
yd ,i (t )  1    i

(171)

The position and velocity errors for the ith vehicle in the normalized coordinate are
given by
yi (t )  yi (t )  yd ,i (t )

(172)

vi (t )  vi (t )  vd  vi (t )

(173)

ui (t )  ui (t )  ud  ui (t )

(174)
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Also, regarding to (167), it is useful to introduce the front relative position errors for the
ith vehicle:
ei (t ) 

Ei (t ) qi 1 (t )  qi (t )  

 yi 1  yi  
L
L

(175)

ei (t ) 

Ei (t ) Vi 1  Vi

 vi 1  vi
L
L

(176)

For = 1, . . . , 𝑚 . The quantities 𝑒𝑖 (𝑡) and 𝑒̇𝑖 (𝑡) denote the relative position and relative
velocity errors between the ith and its predecessor 𝑖 − 1 vehicle.
Therefore, (167) in the normal coordinate will be as

k
k
1
ui  (ui 1  ui )  p ei  d ei
h
h
h

(177)

The relative errors, including the velocity error, are computed by on-board devices
such as GPS, radars, and speed sensors. Consistent with the decentralized linear control
architecture, the dynamics of control signal 𝑢𝑖 of the vehicle 𝑖 is assumed to depend on 1)
its acceleration 𝑢𝑖 , 2) its preceding acceleration, 𝑢𝑖−1 which is received through DSRC
network, 3) relative velocity, 2) the relative position errors between itself and its preceding
vehicle.
PDE Model of Platoon
In this section, we develop a continuous PDE approximation of the discrete platoon
dynamics modelled in section II. Note that the discrete platoon dynamics refers to the model
of platoon explained with ODE set of equations (168)-(177). This model is discrete with
respect to space and is continuous with respect to time. The PDE is derived with respect to
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a scaled spatial coordinate explained in section II with lower case states 𝑦𝑖 (𝑡), 𝑣𝑖 (𝑡), and
𝑢𝑖 (𝑡). Hence, to make the spatially discrete ODE based model to a continuous model, we
define a new position parameter 𝑥 ∈ [0,1]. In effect, the two symbols 𝑥 and 𝑦 correspond
to the same coordinate representation but, are used here to distinguish the continuous and
discrete formulations [103].
The first step to develop the PDE model is to define the continuous approximation.
Referring to normalized coordinate, every car is nominally assumed to lie within an interval
of length ∆ (see Fig. 44(b)). For the purpose of a continuous approximation, we expand each
vehicle over its interval to have a constant mean density (vehicles per unit length) as (178)
for 𝑚 vehicles in the platoon.

0 

1

m



(178)

Furthermore, we assume the following approximation for the velocity in each vehicle's
interval

vi (t )
for x  yi


v( x, t )   vi  vi 1
 yi y  y  ( x  yi 1 )  vi 1 for x  [ yi 1 , yi )
i
i 1


(179)

This approximation grantees that velocity profile in the PDE approximation changes
smoothly in the length of platoon (𝑥).
Next, we define the density of the platoon, 𝜌(𝑥, 𝑡), represents the quantity regarding
to vehicles per unit of length. Local density of, 𝜌(𝑥, 𝑡), at spatial coordinate 𝑥 ∈ [0,1] and
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time 𝑡 ∈ [0, ∞) relates to the velocity 𝑣(𝑥, 𝑡) using the continuity equation of the
macroscopic continuous models of the traffic flow as follows [107]-[108]
  (  v)

0
t
x

(180)

As it can be interpreted from (180), the perturbation in the density causes by the
dynamics of the individual vehicles in the platoon. Local density 𝜌(𝑥, 𝑡) increases
(decreases) as the cars move closer (apart). In order to analyze small perturbations about the
mean values (equilibrium point of the system), we deﬁne the perturbed quantities 𝜌̅ , 𝑣̅ as

 ( x, t )  0   ( x, t ), v( x, t )  v0  v ( x, t ),

(181)

Therefore, for small perturbations around mean values we can linearized (181) to
0  

 ( 0 v0   v0  0 v   v )
t
t t

(182)

recalling (169), we have the mean velocity equals to zero, 𝑣0 = 𝑣𝑑 = 0 and we know 𝜌0 is
constant. Thus, we can re-write (182) as

v

v
 0
0
  0
t
x
t
x

(183)

This equation is consistent with the physical intuition whereby a positive gradient in
velocity (due to say the predecessor speeding up or the follower slowing down) will cause
the local density to decrease. In order to study density perturbations, one thus needs to
specify the velocity which arises due to the linearized momentum balance:
v ( x, t )
 u ( x , t )  u ( x, t )
t

(184)
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where 𝑢(𝑥, 𝑡) is the control signal developed by CACC strategy and equals to acceleration
of the vehicle. To develop the continuous approximation of the acceleration, 𝑢(𝑥, 𝑡), we
consider two terms of (172) and approximate each term separately in the rest of this section.
First term in (172) as
ui 1  ui





ui 1  ui



[


u ( x, t )]x  yi
x

(185)

second term is
ei (t )  yi 1 (t )  yi (t )    (1 

ei (t )  

yi 1
yi

ei (t )  

(1 

1

0



yi 1  yi

)( yi 1  yi )

(186)

 ( x)
)dx
0

yi 1
yi



 ( x, t )dx  

(187)
1

0

 ( x  , t )
(188)

by the Mean Value Theorem [103]-[104], where 𝑥 + ∈ [𝑦𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖−1 ] . Therefore, we can
approximate (188) with

ei ( x, t )  

1

0

 ( x  , t )
(189)

Thus, referring to (177), we will construct a PDE approximation of discrete dynamics in
terms of these continuous approximations as

[u ( x, t )]

x  yi

[

k
k
1 
( u ( x, t ))]x  yi  [ p  ( x, t ) ]x  yi  [ d  ( x, t ) ]x  yi
h0 x
h0
h0
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(190)

where, 𝑘𝑝 and 𝑘𝑑 are used to denote continuous approximations of discrete gains 𝐾𝑃 and
𝐾𝐷 respectively. Then, we arrive at the partial differential equation (PDE) as a model of
the discrete platoon dynamics by

k
k

1 
u ( x, t ) 
( u ( x, t ))  p  ( x, t )  d  ( x, t )
t
h 0 x
h0
h0

(191)

applying (182) into the last term of (191), we get

k
k 

1 
u ( x, t ) 
( u ( x, t ))  p  ( x, t )  d
v( x, t )
t
h 0 x
h0
h x

(192)

using the following notation

v( x, t )
v( x, t )
, v x ( x, t ) 
t
x
 ( x, t )
 ( x, t )
 t ( x, t ) 
,  x ( x, t ) 
t
x
u ( x, t )
u ( x, t )
ut ( x, t ) 
, u x ( x, t ) 
t
x
vt ( x, t ) 

(193)

The state space representation for PDE model of a platoon of vehicles equipped with
CACC strategy is given as

vt  x, t   u  x, t 

(194)

t ( x, t )   0vx ( x, t )

(195)

ut ( x, t ) 

k
k
1
u x ( x, t )  p 2  ( x, t )  d vx ( x, t )
h0
h0
h0

(196)

In this section, we assume that the attacker has knowledge about dynamics of vehicles
into the platoon. Therefore, to implement a non-trivial attack, the attacker designs the fake
vehicle dynamics similar the dynamics other real vehicles in the platoon. Indeed, this fake
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vehicle does not provide wrong sensor/actuator information and can not be detected with
aforementioned methodologies. Injecting fake vehicles into the platoon, directly impacts
the density perturbation in the string. Hence, we can express the effect of fake vehicles as
false data injection attack by

a ( x, t )   ( x, t )   ( xa , ta )

(197)

where, ∆𝜌(𝑥𝑎 , 𝑡𝑎 ) presents the effect of fake vehicles injection at position 𝑥 = 𝑥𝑎 and time
𝑡 = 𝑡𝑎 in the platoon. In this attack scenario, apart from detecting the attack occurrence,
isolating the injection point of the attack is crucial and requires more analysis. Furthermore,
the injection point of the attack determines which vehicles in the platoon are the fake
(ghost) vehicles. In this chapter, to detect the exact position of the false data injection
attack, we take advantages of (i) cascading nature of the platoon which makes delay in
responding to any perturbation in the driving profile. (ii) PDE modeling of the whole
platoon to develop a centralize health monitoring option for platoon.
Therefore, as an overview for the proposed scheme in this chapter to detect the false data
injection attack, the following guideline is provided:
Remark 19: False data injection attack as fake vehicles does not occur in the leader and
last vehicle of the platoon. Hence, the first and last vehicles in the platoon are real vehicles.
7.2. Diagnostics Approach
In this section, we develop a novel diagnosis scheme based on PDE model of the platoon
to detect and isolate the false data injection attack. The isolation of false data injection
attack in a platoon of connected vehicles equals to identifying the position of the fake
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(ghost) vehicle in the string. The proposed diagnosis algorithm works based on the
following guideline:
Step-1: Model the attack as injected fake vehicles in the platoon changing the density
parameter in the platoon PDE model;
Step-2: Design PDE-based observer to estimate the states of the system in no attack
scenario;
Step-3: Derive two residuals using the estimates and measured values of velocity and
acceleration of the vehicles in the platoon;
Step-4: Analyse residuals behavior in both no attack and under attack scenario to develop
unique signature for each case;
We design the state estimation scheme to estimate all states of the PDE model consisting
of 𝜌̅ (𝑥, 𝑡), 𝑣(𝑥, 𝑡), 𝑢(𝑥, 𝑡) using available information. The observer is designed and
implemented in the leader vehicle to monitor whole platoon performance using just one
observer. We assume information regarding to velocity and acceleration of all vehicles in
the platoon is available in the leader vehicle.
Assumption 18: All vehicles in the platoon share their acceleration and velocity
information through the DSRC network with the leader vehicle since the DSRC is a broad
casting shared network.
Remark 20: Available information through the DSRC network are subjected to network
uncertainties and measurement noise.
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Estimation Scheme
Considering assumption 18, in the observer design we have access 𝑣(𝑥, 𝑡) and 𝑢(𝑥, 𝑡) for
whole platoon for ∀ 𝑡 > 0. The following structure is chosen for the PDE observer which
is implemented into the leader vehicle.

vˆt ( x, t )  uˆ ( x, t )  L11 (v ( x, t ))  L12 (u ( x, t ))

(198)

ˆt ( x, t )   0vˆx ( x, t )  L2 (u ( x, t ))

(199)

uˆt ( x, t ) 

k
k
1
uˆ x ( x, t )  p 2 ˆ ( x, t )  d vˆx ( x, t )  L3 (u ( x, t ))
h0
h0
h0

(200)

with the following boundary conditions derived from leader vehicle
vˆ(1, t )  v(1, t ),

uˆ (1, t )  u (1, t )

(201)

where, 𝑣̂(𝑥, 𝑡), 𝜌̅̂(𝑥, 𝑡),, and 𝑢̂(𝑥, 𝑡) are estimates of 𝑣(𝑥, 𝑡), 𝜌̅ (𝑥, 𝑡), and 𝑢(𝑥, 𝑡)
respectively. 𝐿11 , 𝐿12 𝐿2 and 𝐿3 are observer gains to be determined.
Remark 21: Considering each vehicle in the platoon as a point. We have point
measurement based on ODE model of the platoon. However, we used PDE approximation
in section II to develop a continuous mode. Similar approximations and assumptions are
applied for the observer design.
Furthermore, estimation error parameters including 𝑣̃(𝑥, 𝑡), 𝜌̅̃(𝑥, 𝑡) and 𝑢̃(𝑥, 𝑡) are defined
as
v ( x, t )  v( x, t )  vˆ( x, t ),
 ( x, t )   ( x, t )  ˆ ( x, t ),
u ( x, t )  u ( x, t )  uˆ ( x, t )

(202)

Subtracting (194)-(196) from (198)-(200),the error dynamics of the observer are given by
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vt ( x, t )  u ( x, t )  L11 (v ( x, t ))  L12 (u ( x, t ))

(203)

t ( x, t )   0vx ( x, t )  L2 (u ( x, t ))

(204)

ut ( x, t ) 

k
k
1
u x ( x, t )  p 2  ( x, t )  d vx ( x, t )  L3 (u ( x, t ))
h0
h0
h0

(205)

with boundary condition of
v (1, t )  0, u (1, t )  0

(206)

Theorem 1: Consider system modeled by (194)-(196) and the observer designed as (198)(200). There exist observer gains 𝐿11 , 𝐿12 𝐿2 and 𝐿3 such that the error dynamics (203)(205), converges to bounded area in finite time, in the presence of no faults and cyberattacks.

Proof: we provide the proof for this theorem in two stages using Lyapunov analysis
method. First, we start with analysing (203) by choosing (207) as the Lyapunov function
candidate [96].
1

V1 (t ) ‖ v ( x, t ) ‖ 2   v 2 ( x, t )dx

(207)

0

As it can be inferred from (207), for ∀ 𝑥 > 0 and ∀ 𝑡 > 0, 𝑉1 (𝑡) > 0 when 𝑣̃(𝑥, 𝑡) ≠ 0 .
Taking the time derivative of 𝑉1 (𝑡) along the state trajectories, we get
1

V1 (t )   v ( x, t )vt ( x, t )dx

(208)

0

1

V1 (t )   v ( x, t )(u ( x, t )  L11v ( x, t )  L12u ( x, t ))dx
0

choosing 𝐿12 = 1 and 𝐿11 > 0, (209) converts to
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(209)

1

V1 (t )   v 2 ( x, t )dx   L11V1 (t )

(210)

0

Considering any positive initial value of 𝑉1 (𝑡 = 0) = 𝑉1 (0) > 0 we can write
V1 (t )  V1 (0)e  L11t

(211)

Hence, 𝑉1 (𝑡) → 0 as 𝑡 → ∞ asymptotically with the weight of 𝐿11 . Consequently,
𝑣̃(𝑥, 𝑡) → 0 as 𝑡 → ∞. Next, we analyze the error dynamics (204)-(205) using the
following Lyapunov function candidate
V2 (t ) 

b 1
1 1 2
 ( x, t )dx  1  u 2 ( x, t )dx

2 0
2 0

(212)

where 𝑏1 > 0. Differentiating the Lyapunov function candidate along the solution of (203)(205) we obtain
1

1

0

0

V2 (t )    ( x, t ) t ( x, t )dx  b1  u ( x, t )ut ( x, t )dx

(213)

Substituting 𝜌̅̃𝑡 (𝑥, 𝑡) and 𝑢̃𝑡 (𝑥, 𝑡) by (204) and (205) respectively, we have

1

V2 (t )    ( x, t )( 0vx ( x, t )  L2 (u ( x, t ))dx 
0

1

b1  u ( x, t )(
0

k
k
1
u x ( x, t )  p 2  ( x, t )  d vx ( x, t )  L3 (u ( x, t )))dx
h0
h0
h0

(214)

For simplicity, we drop (𝑥, 𝑡) term from the functions
1

1

kp

0

0

h02

V2 (t )   0  vx dx   u( L2  b1
b1

kd
h0



1

0

uvx dx 

b1
h0



1

0

)dx

1

uu x dx  b1L3  u 2 dx
0
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(215)

Choosing 𝐿11 large enough which assures a fast convergence of 𝑣̃(𝑥, 𝑡) → 0, we can
conclude that 𝑣(𝑥, 𝑡) → 𝑣̂(𝑥, 𝑡) and 𝑣𝑥 (𝑥, 𝑡) → 𝑣̂𝑥 (𝑥, 𝑡). Hence, we can neglect terms
related to 𝑣𝑥 in (215) and simplify it to
1

kp

0



V2 (t )    u ( L2  b1

2
0

)dx 

b1
h0

1

1

 uu dx  b L  u dx
0

x

2

1 3 0

(216)

Selecting the observer gain, 𝐿2 as

L2  

b1k p
h 02

(217)

The fisrt term in the right hand side of (216) equals to zero. Therefore, the derivative of 𝑉2
obtains as
V2 (t ) 

b1
h0

1

1

 uu dx  b L  u dx
0

x

2

1 3 0

(218)

Now integrating the first term of the right hand side of (218) we have
1

1

 uu dx  2 u( x, t ) ]
0

x

2 1
0



1
(| u(1, t ) |2  | u(0, t ) |2 )   1 | u(0, t ) |2
2
2

(219)

Next, considering (219) and applying the definition of norm on the second term of right
hand side of (218), we get
V2 (t )  

V2 (t )  

1
b1
| u (0, t ) |2 b1 L3  u 2 dx
0
2h  0

(220)

b1
| u (0, t ) |2 b1 L3 ‖ u (t ) ‖ 2  0
2h  0

(221)

Choosing 𝐿3 > 0 and 𝑏1 > 0, 𝑉̇2 (𝑡) ≤ 0 ∀𝑡 ≥ 0 which describe the decaying behavior
of 𝑉2 (𝑡). Hence, if we restrict the initial conditions so that 𝑉2 (𝑡 = 0) = 𝑉2 (0) is bounded,
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the Lyapunov function 𝑉2 (𝑡) ≤ 𝑉2 (0) remains bounded for all 𝑡 ≥ 0 . Therefore, we obtain
the uniformly boundedness of ‖𝑢̃‖2 and ‖𝜌̅̃‖2 are bounded [98]. Further, to prove the
regulation of the 𝑉̇2 (𝑡) which equals to 𝑉2 (𝑡) → 0 as 𝑡 → ∞ we define function 𝑀(𝑡) as
1

M (t )  b1 L3  u 2 dx

(222)

0

Therefore, from (220) and (222) we can conclude
V2 (t )  M (t )

(223)

Differentiating (222) with respect to time, we get
1

V2 (t )  M (t )  b1L3  uut dx

(224)

0

Substituting 𝑢̃𝑡 from (215), and using fact that 𝑣̃(𝑥, 𝑡) → 0 and 𝑣̃𝑥 (𝑥, 𝑡) → 0, (222) , we get

M (t )  

M (t ) 

b1 L3
h0



1

0

uu x dx 

b1 L3 K p
h 02



1

0

1

u dx  b1 L23  u 2 dx
0

bL K
b1 L3
| u (0, t ) |2  1 3 2 p ((‖ u ‖  ‖  ‖ )  b1L3 ‖ u ‖
h0
h0

(225)

(226)

Since we have measurement on 𝑢(0, 𝑡) we can select 𝑢̂(0, 𝑡) close to actual value with
error of measurement noise. Therefore, |𝑢̃(0, 𝑡)| is bounded. Also, we know ‖𝑢̃‖2 and
‖𝜌̅̃‖2 are uniformly bounded. Therefore, referring to (226) we can conclude 𝑀̇(𝑡) is
bounded and equivalently proves the boundedness of 𝑉̈2 (𝑡) as
V2 (t )  M (t )  

(227)

Furthermore, the boundedness of 𝑉̈2 (𝑡) concludes that 𝑉̇2 (𝑡) is uniformly continuous.
Hence, applying Barbalat lemma [92]on 𝑉̇2 (𝑡) along with the fact that 𝑉2 (𝑡) is bounded,
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we obtain 𝑉̇2 (𝑡) → 0 as 𝑡 → ∞ . At this point, we proved the stability of the estimation
error dynamics which converges to zero as 𝑡 → ∞.

7.3. Attack Diagnostics
The main idea behind attack diagnosis in this chapter is using the perturbation in velocity
profile to poke the inherent effects of the attack which makes the detection easier. Indeed,
the ghost vehicles develop disturbances (changes) in the local density of the platoon. The
leader vehicle perform a small perturbation on the constant velocity profile to detect the
attack and isolate the injected point of the attack in the platoon. Next, we explain in detail
how the attack is diagnosed using the PDE model and the aforementioned idea.
Applying the selected observer gains into the estimation error dynamics explained in(203)(205), we get

vt ( x, t )   L11 (v ( x, t ))

 t ( x, t )    0 v x ( x, t ) 

ut ( x, t ) 

(228)

b1k p
h 02

(u ( x, t ))
(229)

k
k
1
u x ( x, t )  p 2  ( x, t )  d vx ( x, t )  L3 (u ( x, t ))
h0
h0
h0

(230)

with boundary condition of
v (1, t )  0, u (1, t )  0

(231)
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Since, velocity and acceleration of vehicles in the platoon are the two available
measurements of the PDE system, we define two following residuals for attack detection
strategy

r1 ( x, t )  v ( x, t )  v( x, t )  vˆ( x, t )
r2 ( x, t )  u ( x, t )  u ( x, t )  uˆ ( x, t )

(232)

We have analysed the stability of estimation errors dynamics in section V. Under no false
data injection attack, we proved that the estimation error dynamics converge to zero as 𝑡 →
∞. Equivalently, with no attack in the platoon, both residuals 𝑟1 (𝑥, 𝑡) and 𝑟2 (𝑥, 𝑡) converge
to zero. This signature of two residuals is considered as no attack signature.
Next, we analyse the behavior of the residuals in the occurrence of false data injection
attack. In case the attack formulated in (197), 𝑣̃(𝑥, 𝑡) will converge to zero with same
Lypupanov analyse. However, dynamics of the acceleration perturbation in (230) changes
to

ut ( x, t ) 

k
k
k
1
u x ( x, t )  p 2  ( x, t )  d vx ( x, t )  L3 (u ( x, t ))  p 2  ( xa , t a )
h0
h0
h0
h0

(233)

So, the derivation of Lyupanov function𝑉2 (𝑡) will have additional term in (221) as the
effect of 𝛥𝜌(𝑥𝑎 , 𝑡𝑎 ) in acceleration perturbation dynamics
V2 (t )  

b1
| u (0, t ) |2 b1L3 ‖ u (t ) ‖ 2  ‖ u ( xa , ta ) ‖
2h  0

(234)

Therefore, under false data injection attack scenario, the second Lyapunov function 𝑉2 (𝑡)
for analysing convergence of 𝑢̃(𝑥, 𝑡) and 𝜌̅̃(𝑥, 𝑡) will converge to a bounded region.
Equivalently, 𝑢̃(𝑥, 𝑡) and consequently, residual 𝑟2 (𝑥, 𝑡) converges to a bounded area.
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Finally, we can conclude that, in the presence of the false data injection attack, first
residual, 𝑟1 (𝑥, 𝑡), will not change; while, the second residual, 𝑟2 (𝑥, 𝑡), will converge to a
bounded non-zero value. This signature of the residuals is considered as false data injection
attack signature.
One of the possible ways to deal with attack detection using residual values is to use
nonzero threshold set based on no attack behavior of the system. Hence, in the next step,
we select constant threshold values for the obtained residuals in no-attack situation using
the probability distribution method. In this method, first we need to collect residual data,
𝑟𝑖 (𝑥, 𝑡),

𝑖 ∈ {1,2} under no attack scenario of platoon operation. Next, using the

probability distribution characteristics such as mean and standard deviation, we set a
constant threshold for each residual. The constant thresholds 𝛾𝑖 ,

𝑖 ∈ {1,2} as selected

such that the probability of false alarms calculated with are acceptable. where, 𝛾𝑖 is the
selected constant threshold on residual 𝑟𝑖 .

PFAi  

 i





p0 ( x)dx   p0 ( x)dx,
i

(235)

where, 𝑃𝐹𝐴𝑖 i is the probability of attack false alarm in , 𝛾𝑖 is the selected threshold for false
data injection attack and 𝑝0 (𝑥) is the 𝑟𝑖 (𝑥, 𝑡) probability distribution under no attack in the
platoon. The goal here is to select 𝛾𝑖 which will yield an acceptable 𝑃𝐹𝐴𝑖 .
Finally, we can conclude the residual analysis in both no-attack and under attack scenarios
with the following remark.
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Remark 22: The residuals signature is evaluated to determine if false data injection attack
occurs into the connected vehicle platoon. In case of no attack in the system, the signature
of residuals is |𝑟1 (𝑥, 𝑡)| < 𝛾1, and |𝑟2 (𝑥, 𝑡)| < 𝛾2; when the residual signature shows
|𝑟1 (𝑥, 𝑡)| < 𝛾1 and |𝑟2 (𝑥, 𝑡)| > 𝛾2 it determines a false data injection attack is detected in
the system.

7.4. Results and Discussion
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm using the simulation
studies. We consider a platoon of fifteen (𝑚 = 15) identical vehicles equipped with CACC
strategy. Most of the simulation parameter of the platoon are taken similar to existing
literature [30],[64]. The controller gains are constant for all vehicles, i.e., 𝑘𝑝 (𝑥) = 𝐾𝑃 =
0.7 and 𝑘𝑑 (𝑥) = 𝐾𝐷 = 2.5 and the headway is selected as ℎ = 0.2 𝑠. The desired intervehicle distance is considered as ∆= ℎ𝑉𝑑 and desired velocity is 𝑉𝑑 = 20 𝑚/𝑠. The initial
velocity of all vehicles was chosen as the desired velocity and the initial position of the
vehicle was determined as 𝑞𝑖 (𝑡) = 𝑉𝑑 𝑡 + (𝑖 − 1)∆. As a result, the initial relative position
error and velocity error of every vehicle was zero except for the first vehicle. The first
vehicle has a velocity perturbation of 𝑣(1, 𝑡) = 𝑣0 (𝑡) = 0.24𝑠𝑖𝑛(𝑡) which cause an
acceleration perturbation as 𝑢(1, 𝑡) = 𝑢0 (𝑡) = 0.24𝑐𝑜𝑠(𝑡) with respect to the desired
velocity 𝑉𝑑 = 20 𝑚/𝑠 and desired acceleration 𝑈𝑑 = 0 𝑚/𝑠 2 .
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Since the controller gains 𝐾𝑃 and 𝐾𝐷 are constant, the controller gains in the continuous
PDE model are the same. Based upon the Lyapunov analysis discussed in section V, the
2𝑘𝑝

observers gain are selected as 𝐿11 = 700, 𝐿12 = 1, 𝐿2 = − ℎ𝜌2 and 𝐿3 = 50. As it is
0

mentioned in assumption 18, the leader vehicle receives information of velocity and
acceleration of each vehicle in the platoon. To analysis a realistic scenario, we consider
zero mean Gaussian noises as measurement noise for all available velocity and acceleration
measurements. Velocity measurement noises have standard deviation of 𝜎𝑣 = 2𝑐 𝑚⁄𝑠 and
acceleration measurement noises have standard deviation of 𝜎𝑢 = 3𝑐 𝑚⁄𝑠 2 [109]. To test
the convergence properties, observers in the proposed scheme are initialized with incorrect
values except for the leader vehicle. Since, the PDE observers are designed and
implemented in the leader vehicle, the observers have access to the exact measured data of
velocity and acceleration of the leader vehicle as it is formulated in (201).
Next we illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach under the following cases.
Case 1: The scenario that the platoon operates in normal condition with no false data
injection attack; and Case 2: the case study in which false data injection attack occurred
into the system by injecting fake vehicles using fake identity. For each case, the simulation
is run for 70 seconds and the obtained results are further discussed in more details.
Case 1: No Fault Scenario
In this case we consider an ideal communication network in the platoon with no false data
injection attack. The velocity perturbation in the whole platoon is demonstrated in Fig. 44.
Referring to PDE formulation (194)-(196), the leader vehicle is placed at 𝑥 = 1 while the
last vehicle in the platoon is represented at 𝑥 = 0. Fig.45 depicts the minimum velocity
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perturbation in the leader vehicle at 𝑥 = 1. However, as it is expected, the perturbation is
propagated through the length of platoon as we have the largest perturbation in the last
vehicle on the string. The velocity perturbation in the leader vehicle is 𝑣(1, 𝑡) =
0.24 𝑠𝑖𝑛(𝑡) with maximum amplitude of 0.24 𝑚/𝑠. This value is almost tripled in last
vehicle in the platoon with maximum of 0.64 𝑚/𝑠.
An overshoot in the transient behavior of the vehicles in the platoon is noticeable in the
velocity perturbation simulation results. Note that, each vehicle in the platoon receives
information of the preceding vehicle as inputs. Therefore, the velocity of each vehicle is
an output to the receiving information and has transient phase which will propagate through
the platoon. The initial overshoot which is more detectable in the last vehicle of the platoon
(at 𝑥 = 0) is because of step response to receiving perturbation.

Figure 45: Velocity perturbation in the platoon
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Figure 46: Estimated velocity perturbation in the platoon
Fig. 46 shows the estimate value of velocity perturbation for whole platoon which is
obtained with the observers designed in section V. To verify the convergence properties of
the proposed scheme, observers are initialized with incorrect values of velocity
perturbation, acceleration perturbation and density perturbation. The estimation error of
the velocity perturbation is given in Fig. 47. As it can be inferred, the estimate value
converges to actual value of velocity perturbation. The estimation error converges to zero
asymptotically with the rate of 𝐿11 = 700 with measurement noise.
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Figure 47: Estimation error for velocity perturbation in the platoon

Fig. 48 represents the actual acceleration perturbation in vehicles in our case study platoon.
As it can be demonstrated from this plot, the acceleration perturbation also propagates
through the platoon from the leader to the last follower in the string. The acceleration
perturbation of the leader vehicle is 𝑢(1, 𝑡) = 0.24 𝑐𝑜𝑠(𝑡) with maximum amplitude of
0.24 𝑚/𝑠 2 , while the maximum acceleration perturbation in the vehicle in the platoon
reaches to 0.64 𝑚/𝑠 2 . Similar to the velocity perturbation, the transient response of the
acceleration perturbation settles into the steady state within less than 5 seconds.
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Figure 48: Actual acceleration perturbation in the platoon

The estimate value of acceleration perturbation in the platoon is give by Fig. 49. Except
for the leader vehicle, the initial acceleration perturbation values for all vehicles in the
platoon is chosen incorrectly to test the convergence properties of observers. Fig. 50
presents the error between actual measured acceleration permutation and the estimate
values in the whole platoon. As it is shown in the plot, the estimation error converges to a
bounded area in finite time.
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Figure 49: Estimated acceleration perturbation in the platoon

Figure 50: Estimation error for acceleration perturbation in the platoon
Density perturbation in the platoon, 𝜌 (𝑥, 𝑡) is represented in Fig. 51 as function of position
(vehicle in the platoon) and time. The leader vehicle has a density perturbation value of
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𝜌 (1, 𝑡) = −3.6 𝑐𝑜𝑠(𝑡). As it is expected the perturbation is propagated into the platoon
and the last vehicle in the platoon has a maximum density perturbation of 10.3. Since the
perturbation is a function of velocity, the initial transient response reaches to steady state
in less than 5 seconds.

The estimate value of density perturbation for whole platoon is depicted in Fig. 52 and the
estimation error is given by Fig. 53. As it can be inferred from the plot, the estimated
density perturbation converges to its actual value in finite time. The error of the estimation
remains less than 0.5 which verifies convergence properties proved in Section V using
Lyapunov method. The value of 𝜌̃(1, 𝑡) represents the estimation error of density
perturbation in leader vehicle. Since the observer is designed in the leader vehicle, both
estimate value and actual value of density perturbation in position of leader vehicle, 𝑥 = 1
are same. Hence, 𝜌̃(1, 𝑡) = 0, however, for the rest of the platoon, due to the existence of
measurement noise in velocity and acceleration, and incorrect chosen initial values of
𝑣̂(𝑥, 0), 𝑢̂(𝑥, 0), and 𝜌̂(𝑥, 0).
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Figure 51: Actual density perturbation in the platoon

Figure 52: Estimated density perturbation in the platoon
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Figure 53: Estimation error for density perturbation in the platoon
Next, we define two constant thresholds for the obtained residuals, 𝑟1 (𝑥, 𝑡) = 𝑣̃(𝑥, 𝑡) and
𝑟2 (𝑥, 𝑡) = 𝑢̃(𝑥, 𝑡)using the concept explained in section V. Since only second residual
𝑟2 (𝑥, 𝑡) is critical to determine the false data injection attack, we mainly focus on this
residual. Analysing the obtained data for 𝑢̃(𝑥, 𝑡) in this section under no attack , we select
|𝛾2 (𝑥, 𝑡)| = 0.03 to determine the boundary for threshold as shown in Fig. 54. Therefore,
if the residual 𝑟2 (𝑥, 𝑡) exceed the threshold |𝛾2 (𝑥, 𝑡)| we interpret the event as false data
injection attack occurrence.
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Figure 54: Residual probabilty desnity for thereshold setting

Case 2: Fault Data Injection Scenario

In this scenario, we inject the fake vehicles as false data injection attack into the platoon.
We consider two fake vehicles to be injected in the middle of the platoon between vehicle
number 7 and 8. These fake vehicles add additional density into the platoon in the injected
point. Hence, the estimated density perturbation will not match with the actual density
perturbation in the disrupted point in the platoon. The proposed algorithm is capable of
detecting the density disruption as well as identifying the position of the attack in the
platoon system. Fig. 55 depicts the first residual, 𝑟1 (𝑥, 𝑡) equivalent to estimation error for
velocity perturbation, 𝑣̃(𝑥, 𝑡) under false data injection attack scenario. As it is discussed
in Subsection B of Section V, we destined the observers such that the first residual does
not show the effect of the attack. However, the second residual, 𝑟2 (𝑥, 𝑡) corresponding to
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estimation error for acceleration perturbation has non-zero value when attack occurs into
the system. Fig. 56 represent estimation error of acceleration perturbation for the whole
platoon. As it can be inferred, the estimation error converges to a has non-zero bounded
value at 𝑥 = 0.5 corresponding to 7th vehicle of the platoon representing of attack
occurrence. Since the attack remains in the system for whole time of the simulation, the
non-zero value of the estimation error remains for all time of the simulation 𝑡 ∈ [0,80].
To illustrate the attack detection using the pre-defined threshold, Fig. 46 shows the residual
𝑟2 (𝑥, 𝑡) with the constant threshold, 𝛾2 (𝑥, 𝑡) = 0.03. The pre-defined threshold 𝛾2 (𝑥, 𝑡) is
depicted via pink surfaces at 𝑟2 (𝑥, 𝑡) = 0.03 and 𝑟2 (𝑥, 𝑡) = −0.03. It can be inferred from
the Fig.57, in the occurrence of the false data injection attack, the residual 𝑟2 (𝑥, 𝑡) surpasses
the set threshold declaring that the attack is happening in the system.

Figure 55: Estimation error for velocity perturbation under false data attack injection
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Figure 56: Estimation error for acceleration perturbation under false data attack
injection

Figure 57: Estimation error for acceleration perturbation as residual 𝑟2 (𝑥, 𝑡) under
false data attack injection
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CHAPTER EIGHT
DECISION MAKING
To combine the aformationed strategies in an integrated control strategy, a hybrid format
controller is required to determine which types of cyber-attacks is happening in the system
and what is the coresponiding strategy to minimize the effect of that specific attack. To
achive this objective, we design a descion maker using optimum control algorithm to
choose the best control signal among the avialbable choices. We formulate the optimization
problem with a MPC problem in which the cost function penalize the agresive driving
profile as well as selecting safest relative distance to avoid collision.

Figure 58: Hybrid system scheme
8.1. Problem Formulation

In this section, we refere to the two strategeis proposed in chapter five and chapter seven
for packet dorpping and denial of service attack respectively. We develop a scenario
including both packet dropping phenomena and DoS attack to illustrate the effectiveness
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of the decision making algorithm in selecting right strategy. Indeed, in each sample time,
the decsion making block receives three choices of control signal as
1- Actual Control Signal: This is the actual control singal obtained from the CACC
algorithm while actual information received through the DSRC network. The
information received through DSRC network is subjected to packet dropping and DoS
attack. In fact, the Actual Control signal is the control signal without applying any
resilient strategy. We refer to this control signal as 𝑢𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙
2- Packet Dropout Control Signal: This control singal is the output of the modified CACC
while the strategy of the packet dropping phenomena is applied into the system. We
refer to this control signal as 𝑢𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡_𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑
3- Denial of Service Control Signal: This control singal is the output of the modified
CACC while the strategy of the denial of srvice attack is applied into the system. We
refer to this control signal as 𝑢𝐷𝑜𝑆_𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑
Intuitively, we expect that, the packet dorpping srategy acts better than DoS attack
strategy when there is packet dropping phenomena in the communicaiton network. In
contrast, we expect that the strategy of the DoS attack has a better perfoamnce comparint to
the packet dropping strategy when there is actually a DoS attack in the DSRC network.
We formulate the MPC problem as
min 𝐽 = ∑𝑖=1,…,𝑁 𝜔1 𝑑𝑖 2 + 𝜔2 𝑢𝑖 2

(236)

𝑢𝑖 ∈ 𝑈

where, 𝑈 = {𝑢𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 , 𝑢𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡_𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑 , 𝑢𝐷𝑜𝑆_𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑 }
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8.2. Simulation results
For the simulation scenario, we consider a US06 driving cycle as the velocity profile for
the leader vehicle. Similar to the rest of the simulation scenarios in this research we
consider a platoon of vehicles equipped with CACC strategy. To illustrate the effectiveness
of the proposed algorithm we discuss the performance of Vehicle 3 in the platoon as an
example.
The simulation run for 600 seconds, the first 50 seconds the communication network works
ideally with no packet dropping or delay. At t=50 for 250 seconds we inject the DoS attack
with an effect of = 5 𝑠 . After the DoS attack, we consider the network works ideally again
for another 100 seconds. At time t= 400 s, we inject packet dropping failure into the DSRC
network with 𝜆 = 0.3 (the probability of losing data) which remains till the end of the
simulation time. Fig. 59 shows the relative distance of Vehicle 3 with respect to its
predecessor vehicle (𝑑3 ) under different strategies with the explained attack in the
communication network. The ideal behavior of the Vehicle 3 when there is no attack or
packet dropping in DSRC is depicted with blue curve as a criteria for comparison. The
actual relative distance 𝑑3 is shown with solid black curve. The actual signal represents
the actual behavior of the Vehicle 3 under DoS attack and packet dropping while there is
no strategy applied in the controller. As we can see in more visualized plot in Fig. 60, in 5
points of the plot, the relative distance is less than zero representing accident with the
preceding car. Next, we apply only the packet dropping strategy on the controller and the
result is shown with dashed green curve. Similarly, we only apply the DoS attack strategy
and the result of the Vehicle 3 relative distance is shown via dashed red line. As it can be

144

inferred from Fig. 59, the packet dropping algorithm help the Vehicle 3 to behave very
close to its ideal performance in part of the simulation when packet dropping occurs in the
DSRC network. However, the packet dropping strategy fails to help the Vehicle 3 when
DoS attack is happening the communication network. In contrast, DoS attack strategy acts
very well in the time slot that actually DoS attack is injected in the DSRC network while,
it is not resilient toward packet dropping phenomena. The acceleration data is also provided
in Fig. 61, illustrating similar argument results.
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Figure 59: Relative distance of the Vehicle 3 under ideal DSRC network (blue), DSRC
under attack while packet dropping strategy applied (dashed green), DSRC under attack
and no strategy applied (black) and DSRC under attack while DoS attack strategy applied
(dashed red).
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Figure 60: Visulaized relative distance of the Vehicle 3 under ideal DSRC and under
attack.
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Figure 61: Acceleration the Vehicle 3 (control signal) under ideal DSRC and under
attack while packet dropping strategy applied (dashed green), DSRC under attack and no
strategy applied (black) and DSRC under attack while DoS attack strategy applied
(dashed red).
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The provided results for this scenario, validates the necessity of essential decision
making algorithm for choosing write strategy corresponding to the existing attack/network
failure in the CPS. To achieve this objective along with maintaining the smooth driving
profile, we developed the MPC strategy as (236) which provides the following results
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Figure 62: Behavior of the Vehicle 3 under ideal DSRC network (blue), and DSRC
under attack scenario with resilient control strategies applied via optimum decision
making algorithm (red).
As it can be inferred from Fig. 62, the optimum decision making algorithm chooses
suitable decision to have the keep the performance of the platoon close to the normal.
Furthermore, the decision guarantees the safe relative distance as well as smooth driving
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behavior which is similar to deriving profile when the DSRC has ideal communication. The
selected control action in each sample time is shown in Fig. 63.
Control Action Segmentation
4

Uactual
UDoS- Applied

Acceleration Vehicle 3 [ m\s^2 ]

3

UPacket- Applied
2
1
0
-1
-2
-3
-4

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

Time [s]

Figure 63: Selected control action during US06 driving cycle via decision making
block.
As it can be inferred from Fig. 63, in the first part of the driving cycle, when the
DoS attack occurs in the DSRC network, the decision making block mainly chooses DoS
strategy specially for critical points where Collison could happen such as 𝑡 = 110𝑠 or 𝑡 =
118 𝑠, where we have higher acceleration or deceleration in the driving profile. However,
after 𝑡 = 400 𝑠 when packet dropping is happening in the DSRC, the decision making
chooses mainly packet dropping strategy to modify control strategy of the platoon.
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CHAPTER NINE
SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORKS
9.1. Dissertation Summary
This dissertation is concerned with security of cyber physical systems with particular
focus on connected vehicles. Despite being widely applicable in various industries and
infrastructures, cyber physical system suffer from issues regarding to safety, security and
reliability. To improve the performance of the CPS, these issues should be addressed which
requires good knowledge on attack modeling, cyber-attack detection and attack resilient
strategies. Along with cyber-attacks, CPS also requires physical health monitoring with
regard to physical faults as well as network failures. Motivated by this scenario, this
dissertation proposed a set of hybrid strategies to make cyber physical systems resilient
toward cyber-attacks as well as physical faults and network failures. These strategies are
based on control/systems theory tools and physical models of the CPS that would be
beneficial for maintaining the performance and functionality of the CPS in the presence of
malfunction and cyber-attacks.
In Chapter 2, a brief introduction has been given on working principle of connected
vehicles and modeling of the connected vehicles equipped with Cooperative Adaptive
Cruise Control (CACC). Next, in Chapter 3 we have a state- of- art- literature review on
cyber-attacks modeling and security in cyber physical systems in occurrence of common
cyber-attacks. The chapter also includes a brief review over diagnostics and observer design
tools.
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In Chapter 4, a sensor/actuator fault diagnosis problem is explored for a connected
vehicle system under CACC. The diagnostic scheme has two sliding mode observers to
detect, isolate and estimate different sensor faults in the individual vehicles; the CACC
controller uses this estimated fault information to reconstruct the control signal. Therefore,
inclusion of the diagnostic scheme essentially supplies the controller with more accurate
information which in turn improves the overall safety of the connected vehicles. Simulation
studies are presented which confirm the effectiveness of the diagnostic scheme.
In Chapter 5, the diagnostic scheme has two components: 1) A sample hold strategy
and 2) A Kalman filter-based estimation scheme to reconstruct the data under packet drop
outs; the filter provides an improved estimate of the data received via communication
network, which is in turn used by the CACC controller to construct the control signal.
In Chapter 6, we proposed three algorithms to estimate the effect of denial of service
attack as time delay. The first algorithm considers the statistic time delay as the effect of
DoS attack, while, the latter two algorithms model DoS attack as the saturated attack with
constant unknown delay. In first section of proposed research, an observer-based algorithm
is presented for state estimation for vehicle platooning. The proposed algorithm consists of
three main components including a Luenberger observer operates for ideal case of no attack
in the system and a model-based observer and delay estimator for under-attack situation.
This scheme is capable to detect DoS attack in DSRC communication network as well as
estimating states of preceding vehicle for each car. Therefore, the modified CACC using
estimated states can avoid potential dangers and present better performance. As future work,
the scheme should be validated with experimental data.
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In the second algorithm, we propose a real-time scheme for diagnosis of Denial of
Service (DoS) cyber-attack in connected vehicles. Under DoS, the attacker keeps the
communication network busy by sending fake requests and hence the network is unable to
respond to legitimate requests from the real users. Specifically, the proposed scheme can
potentially (i) detect the occurrence of DoS, and (ii) estimate its effect on the connected
vehicle system. We model the effect of the attack by a time delay in the information
processing via communication network. The main goal of the proposed scheme is to track
this delay in information processing. The proposed scheme consists of a set of observers
designed via sliding mode theory and adaptive observer theory. Simulation case studies are
provided to verify the effectiveness of the proposed scheme. Furthermore, the robustness
of the scheme is verified (i) under several forms of parametric uncertainties, and (iii) several
measurement noise scenarios.
In the third algorithm, we consider a more general problem with delay (as the effect
of DoS attack) in cyber physical systems. Hence, an observer-based algorithm is presented
to estimate the current states of a distributed cyber physical system while, only delayed
measurements are available. The existing delay in the system measurements is a constant
unknown value. The proposed scheme consists of two separate components: (1) a PDE
model- based adaptive observer to estimate the unknown constant delay in the system and
(2) a Luenburger observer to predict the states of the system based on an estimated delay
obtained from the first observer. This scheme is capable of detecting and estimating
unknown constant delay in cyber physical systems and estimate the correct states of the
system despite delay. Hence, it is a valuable method for precise health monitoring
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applications in CPS and for modifying the controller of the system to compensate the effects
of the delay. As for future works, the scheme can be used to modify the control strategy of
the system to compensate the impact of the delay in cyber physical and networked control
systems.

In Chapter 7, we considered a platoon of vehicles equipped with CACC strategy.
The vehicles moving in a single straight line following their leader in a constant velocity
and speciﬁc inter-vehicle distance. A continuous model using PDE approximation is
developed to describe the dynamics of the platoon. Further, we modeled the false data
injection attack in the platoon with injected ghost vehicles disturbing the local density
perturbation characteristics of the platoon. To detect and isolate the false data injection
attack into the platoon, we develop an observer based diagnostics algorithm. The proposed
diagnostics scheme is developed based on PDE model and available measurements on
velocity and acceleration of the vehicles in the platoon. Two residuals are derived from the
presented scheme using the pre-deﬁne constant thresholds. The residuals behaviors are
studied in both no attack and under attack scenarios and unique signature is developed for
each scenario. Two case studies are conducted in the simulation results to illustrate the
effectiveness of the presented algorithm. The results of these two scenarios verify the
convergence of the PDE observer and demonstrate the capability of the algorithm to detect
and isolate the injection point of the false data injection attack.
Finally, in Chapter 8 we presented an MPC based algorithm to select among
available control strategies based on (1) smooth driving and (2) safe relative distance to
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compensate the effect of existing network failures/ cyber-attacks in the communication
network.

9.2. Future Works
Experimental validation: None of the presented algorithms are validated with the
experimental test due to the lack of suitable hardware to create the platoon of vehicle (or
robots) sharing their information through the commination network. These algorithms
should be validated by experimental studies. However, to do the same, new experimental
methods should be developed based on CACC control strategy and DSRC network
characteristics.
Observer design for more comprehensive models: In the proposed algorithms and
observer design, mainly we have assumed linear model of the platoon of connected vehicles.
Although majority of the presented algorithms are based on control theories which are
applicable to nonlinear systems e.g. sliding mode observer design, adaptive observer design,
it would be good extension to apply the proposed tools to nonlinear model of platoon.
More comprehensive attack modeling: Some of the modeling of the cyber-attacks
or network failure can be more complicated from what is used in this thesis such as Morkov
model for packet dropping and DoS model.
Stochastic decision making strategy: The inherent of the cyber-attacks is not
deterministic. Therefore, it will be more efficient to provide a stochastic decision making
scenario to switch among the strategies e.g. game theory based algorithms.
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